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This thesis is a study of the integrative management technique of
Management by Objectives and its application to problems of naval
communications management, career development and training that
are of concern to the headquarters level of naval communications . As
part of this study, a pilot Management by Objectives implementation
project was conducted at the U. S. Naval Communications Station
San Francisco, based in part on a computer simulation model developed
for the naval communications environment. The project was designed
to examine implementation problems unique to the communications
environment, and to assist in developing key objectives for operational
and personnel management of the Communications Department. Prob-
lems of the implementation and results obtained are discussed, includ-
ing recommendations for further study to fully assess the contributions





A. PROBLEMS FACING NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS 6
B. APPLICATION OF MANAGEMENT BY
OBJECTIVES 9
C. SCOPE OF STUDY 14
II. REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES 17
A. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES CONCEPT 17
B. REPRESENTATIVE MANAGEMENT BY
OBJECTIVES PROCESS 19
C. IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVES 24
D. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISMS OF MANAGEMENT
BY OBJECTIVES 29
III. DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE 38
A. DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS STATION
ORGANIZATION 38
B. INITIALLY PLANNED IMPLEMENTATION
PROCEDURE 41
C. USE OF MBO ADVISORS 42
D. DESIGN OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE 44
E. COMPUTER SIMULATION MODEL 45
IV. IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE USED 58
A. MEASUREMENT OF INCREASED MANAGERIAL
EFFECTIVENESS 58
B. COMMAND INDOCTRINATION AND PROJECT
A CCEPTAN CE 61

C. DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES USED 64
V. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 75
A. RESULTS OF MBO PROJECT 75
B. DISCUSSION OF IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
ENCOUNTERED 78
C. OVERALL EVALUATION OF STUDY 81
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 83
APPENDIX A ASSESSMENT CENTER TECHNIQUE 85
APPENDIX B LIST OF REPRESENTATIVE COMPANIES
USING MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES 94
APPENDIX C MANAGEMENT GUIDE PROCEDURES 96
APPENDIX D COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT
MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES HANDOUT 98




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 134
FORM DD 1473 136

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The time and effort given by the personnel of the U. S. Naval
Communications Station San Francisco in svipport of this study
is gratefully acknowledged. We hope they gained as much from their
exposure to Management by Objectives as we, as students of Com-





It must be remembered that there is nothing more
difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, nor
more dangerous to manage, than the creation of a
new system. For the initiator has the enmity of
all who would profit by the preservation of the old
institutions and merely lukewarm defenders in
those who would gain by the new ones.
Machiavelli, THE PRINCE ( 15 13)
The purpose of this study is to examine current management and
operational problems affecting naval comrnunications and to analyze
the management by objectives technique as a means for solving these
problems. The first section discusses these problems and the applica-
tion of management by objectives as an analytical and problem- solving
method.
A. PROBLEMS FACING NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS
Present technology and projected future communications require-
ments and available resources have predicated needs for extensive
automation and consolidation of a majority of naval communications
facilities. We feel this will necessarily require a re- evaluation of
current operational and administrative goals as they apply to
1
This was the focus of an article in the January 1970 issue of
Signal magazine, the publication of the Armed Forces Communications
and Electronics Association, by RADM F. J. Fitzpatrick, USN, then
Commander Naval Communications Command.

maintaining an effective and efficient naval communications system
of the future.
This situation is complicated by a reduction in personnel strengths
in across-the-board cuts as the Navy moves into a "leaner, trimmer"
2
post-Vietnam posture.
Additional losses in naval communications personnel strength
are anticipated due to an unusually high number of civilian employees
eligible for retirement simultaneously over the next few years. In
an address before the Senior Line Managers Institute (of the Office
of Civilian Manpower and Management), on 15 December 1971, Rear
Admiral Samuel L. Gravely, Commander, Naval Communications
Command, voiced his concern over this situation:
With our career civilians, as with our officer and
enlisted personnel, we are deeply concerned abotit
the necessity for maintaining an adequate reservoir
of talent to meet predictable future needs. Again,
this extends to all levels of civilian effort, but it is
particularly pressing in the Communications Spe-
cialist and Communications -Electronics fields at
the GS-9 through GS-15 levels. For example-
-
within the next three years, some 18 percent of the
civilian Communications Specialists now working
2 From an address by Vice Admiral D. H. Baglcy, USN, Chief of
Naval Personnel, before the worldwide Civilian Personnel Officers
Conference, 29 September 1972, on the topic of the future of the Navy
Personnel Structure, both military and civilian. James E. Johnson,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
addressed this situation and supports VADM Bagley's remarks on the
personnel structure of the immediate future.

for the Naval Communications Command will be
eligible for retirement. Within the next five
years, the figure will rise to 42 percent. And
within the next ten years it will rise to 78 percent.
Maintaining an adequate reservoir for filling future manpower needs
is critically dependent upon personnel development and training.
The recognition of these and additional organizational and tech-
nical problems affecting naval communications was formally presented
in the report from the Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO) Industry
Advisory Committee on Telecommunications (CIACT), delivered to
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, CNO, on 26 July 1972. This report followed
a full year of intensive effort by the CIACT group. Briefly, this
report states that in the face of proven technology and current
requirements:
. . . the Navy's challenge in the telecommunications field is to:
1. Organize properly;
2. Develop and train the necessary professionals;
3. Develop and implement an overall plan; .
4. Raise the annual investment to an adequate level.
The CIACT report designated ten major areas of naval commun - ;a
tions requiring improvements. The two of most concern here are
improvements in (1) general organization and management and (2)
career development and training.
3 From an address by Rear Admiral Samuel L. Gravely, "Manage-
ment and the Motivation of People in the Naval Communications
Command", reprinted in Civilian Manpower and Management, Spring/
Summer, 1972, p. 2_3.




Rear Admiral, USN, "From the Com-
mander, " Naval Communications Bulletin, No. 12 3, p. 1.

B. APPLICATION OF MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES
In brief, Management by Objectives (MBO) is best described
as a proces s:
whereby the superior and subordinate managers of
an organization jointly identify its common goals,
define each individual's major area of responsibility
in terms of the results expected of him, and use
these measures as guides for operating the unit and
assessing the contributions of each of its members.
MBO centers on the motivation of the individual to do his best to
help accomplish the overall objectives of the organization. It is this
involvement in the act of management that elicits responsible action
from people, as noted in Humble [1970]. With effective consultation
and review, individual achievement is acknowledged, thus providing
the motivation for continued efforts towards successful achievement
and acceptance of more challenging tasks. An important part of the
process is a well-defined work performance review method. Having
mutually determined the performance objectives of the subordinate,
the superior has available the guidelines necessary to evaluate his
subordinate's accomplishments
.
Although the overall goal of MBO is to achieve organization
objectives by improving managerial performance, several valuable
spin-offs result from the implementation and continuing process of




Management by Objectives, p. 55-56,
Pitman, 1965.

1. Measuring and judging performance objectively;
2. Relating individual performance to organizational
objectives
;
3. Clarifying both the job to be done and the expecta-
tions of accomplishment;
4. Fostering the increasing competence and develop-
ment of the subordinate;
5. Enhancing communications between superior and
subordinate;
6. Serving as a basis for judgments about salary,
rewards and promotion;
7. Stimulating the subordinate's motivation; and
8. Serving as a device for organizational control and
integration.
In many instances these products themselves have become the
mainstay and focal point of MBO, in separate applications, reflect-
ing the flexibility and far reaching effects of this management
process
.
It is the premise of this thesis that the MBO concept appears
especially suited to provide an integrated approach to solving naval
communications problems. Its procedure of critical analysis of
organizational and unit objectives, problems and areas of improveme t
can result in task force and individual responsibilities to secure
planned results and improvements. Operational, technical and
personnel communications requirements can be approached using
r
"Although these eight items follow generally those suggested
by Levinson [1970], they represent a general common thread
found in much of the MBO literature [Humble, 1970; Odiorne, 1965;
Reddin, 1970; and Schleh, 1961].
10

7Key Results Analysis to examine management jobs (and responsibil-
ities) and to establish or strengthen existing operational performance
standards, control information and authority relationships. These
factors are integrated through the joint performance and potential
reviews of the MBO process between the manager and his superior.
It is this step which we feel enhances planning for managerial succes-
sion and identification of proven performers needed to fill personnel
gaps. In turn this would strengthen the personnel continuity required
during the rapid evolution planned for future communications develop-
ments. Joint performance and potential reviews wotild improve
individual management development as well as provide for a specific
career advancement program for the communications specialist.
We feel that an additional justification of an MBO approach to
the problems discussed earlier is the recent interest by the Bureau
of Naval Personnel in obtaining a more objective and useful evaluation
of Naval Officers. This feeling was gained during a review of the
current instruction, "Report on the Fitness of Officers", BUPERS
INSTRUCTION 1611. 12, issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel on
20 March 1972. Included in this instruction are changes to the
Key Result Analysis is a specific term used by Humble [1970]
to describe the process used by a manager to analyze the main
purpose of his job, his position with the organization, his respon-
sibilities, and limits of authority. This will be covered in detail
in a later section.
11

reporting procedures designed to improve the evaluation of Naval
Officers by (1) facilitating more effective coinmunications between
the reporting senior (appraisor) and the decision groups for advance-
ment and assignment, and (2) to make the subject officer more aware
of the basis upon which he is being evaluated. For example, section
4-11 d.
,
indicated as a change to the previous instruction, states:
In order to foster a concept of "management by objectives",
reporting seniors should seek to establish with each and
every subordinate mutually understood finite objectives
for which the subordinate will be held accountable. Sub-
sequent fitness reports should then contain comment upon
the degree of attainment of each such objective.
Additionally, an experimental Officer "Appraisal" Form is
o
presently being evaluated by the Center For Naval Analysis. It
contains specific aspects of performance evaluation by superiors
dealing with itemized areas of an officer's abilities as "Goal Setting
and Achievement" and "Subordinate Development and Management".
We feel, however, that decisions for advancement of personnel
as part of a personnel development program require information not
completely provided by the MBO process nor any existing management
A number of these experimental Officer Fitness Report Forms
have been circulated for evaluation as proposed by the Center for
Naval Analysis (CNA) in its memorandum 1897-72, dated 8 December
1972, "Proposed New Officer Performance Evaluation System".
It must be noted that this is only a trial program and may not survive
final evaluation, but it is an indication of the interest in developing
a more realistic and objective evaluation.
12

procedure in use by the Navy. It is an additional premise of this
thesis that a separate personnel assessment technique is a logical
distinction from, but a necessary follow-on to, the MBO process.
MBO purportedly provides the objectivity and feedback necessary
to appraise and evaluate performance [Mali, 1972], but does it
provide the information necessary to properly consider advancements
and promotion? We agree with Odiorne [1965] that MBO:
. . . cannot appraise and completely identify potential.
The system deals only with performance on the present
job. Appraisal of potential must be done separately. '
It has been shown conclusively by Dunnette [ 1966] and Kelly [1967]
that different types of jobs or levels within one job functional area
often require different behavior or personal requirements. Thus,
personnel appraisal based on past performance can lead to wrong
decisions in job advancement.
Sufficient interest in improving selection techniques for staffing
higher management positions from within the organization has been
generated by several Navy offices. The issuance of Secretary of the
Navy Notice 12412 of 26 April 1972, and Naval Material Instruction
12412. 1, both pertaining to "Civilian Executive Development" within
the Navy, are two examples. These references pertain to finding
solutions to the same problem of gaps in the personnel ranks as





Part of the background research for this MBO study pursued
extensively the Assessment Center technique as a supplement
to MBO, continuing where Odiorne feels MBO stops. The Assess-
ment Center technique is a program for assessing job behaviors in
personnel recommended for advancement that relate to those job
behaviors required in the positions to which they may be advanced.
The result of MBO followed by the Assessment Center is visualized
as a combination of personnel management procedures which develops
and objectively identifies proven performers, then critically and
effectively assesses those performers for higher managerial positions
requiring different job behavior requirements that may not have been
necessary or visible in the previous position. Appendix A continues
this argument and provides additional background on the Assessment
Center technique.
C. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
It was felt that an evaluation of MBO in relation to the factors
as presented in Sections A and B above would serve as a useful study
to the Navy and for ourselves as Communications Management Sub-
specialists.
We approached the study by conducting a thorough review of the
MBO literature available. This included analyzing the concept from
a naval communications environment viewpoint and in terms of its
vakie and application in solving the problems of naval communications
as we envision them.
14

We began to solidify the study as we worked with advisors on the
faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, who
were involved in a pilot MBO implementation project at the Naval
Supply and Regional Finance Centers in San Diego, California. The
Naval Communications Station San Francisco, located on Rough and
Ready Island, Stockton, California, was selected for a pilot study as
the closest site and becaxise of its operational importance in the
naval communications network.
The final form of the pilot study at the communications station
was structured to accomplish three main objectives:
1. To implement an MBO system within the time frame
available, examining implementation problems
particular to the communications station environment.
2. To assess as accurately as possible the results of
MBO as implemented and to assist with the develop-
ment of key objectives for operational and personnel
management of the communications station.
3. To gain an insight into naval communications functions
and organization for our own professional development
as Communications Management Subspecialists
.
The unfortunate weakness of attempting this pilot project was
that as advisors for the MBO implementation, we could only visit
Stockton one day of each week because of the distance involved and
the requirement to attend our regular classes. This is hardly an
ideal situation, according to Humble [1970], because of the importance
of insuring enthusiasm and continuity to the daily process of the MBO
15

routine during the sensitive stages of introduction and implementation.
We have attempted to address the effects of this situation in Part V
of the thesis in our evaluation of the study.
16

II. REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES
In this section we review the concept and development of MBO
as it has been applied to various organizations with' similar problems
as those we believe are also facing naval communications. Specific
emphasis on the analysis and criticisms of the MBO process is
presented to illustrate its depth and magnitude in influencing an
organization's activities.
A. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES CONCEPT
According to Mali [1972], the concept of MBO was first presented
in 1954 in a chapter from Drucker's The Practice of Management,
titled "The Objectives of a Business. " Drucker sought to show
that by integrating the individual's needs with the company's there
would result a more motivated and company-oriented employee.
Schleh, borrowing from presentations of other management thinkers,
developed a "cohesive philosophy of management" which he called
"results management" and presented this philosophy in his book
Management by Results [Schleh, 1961]. Schleh focused his concept
on the relationship between the supervisor and employee, using the
theine that all management must be looked at from a grass-roots
Drucker, P. F.
,
The Practice of Management, p. 62-65,
126-129, Harper & Row, 1954^
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approach that focuses on what must be accomplished at the bottom
level of an enterprise" [Schleh, 1961]. Later, in 1964, Drucker
sought to crystalize his concept of participative management by-
focusing on the economic - inputs versus outputs _ of managing
in his book Managing for Results [Drucker, 1964].
During those ten years management specialists and consultants,
such as Odiorne and Humble, began systematically developing the
concept of MBO and directing its application towards specific use
in many business fields. MBC is currently in operation in a variety
of industrial organizations. A list of representative firms is con-
tained in Appendix B.
Presently there are many other writers and practicing man-
agerial consultants in the MBO field. Much of their work has been
influenced not only by Drucker, Odiorne and Humble, but also by
the basic works of such management theorists as Likert and
McGregor. Likert's "linking pin" concept which is based on the
principles of supportive relationships derived from recognition of
the worth of human resources and the value of participative manage-
ment [Likert, 1961], and McGregor's influence to recognize the
need of performance appraisal to consider the subordinate as an
active agent rather than a passive object if management development
18

is to be meaningful [McGregor, 1957], are very visible in the
principles of MBO.
B. REPRESENTATIVE MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES PROCESS
Except for slight variations in team approach use, the following
representative process is similar to that suggested in Humble's book
Management by Objectives in Action [1970]. We have listed the actual
steps of the MBO process that would follow the introduction and
training phase of MBO during a typical implementation of the program
into an organization.
1. Re- evaluate the organization's objectives.
To do this calls for a critical look inside the organization
to assess the reasons for its existence, what it is that the organiza-
tion does, what its plans are, what direction it must go to meet
those plans (considering external influences) and to establish broad
objectives that support this assessment. Factors which supply
strength or weakness to the overall effectiveness of the organizatior
are considered. This re-evaluation is carried out at the highest
level of the organization or unit by those top managers in overall
control. Examples of objectives which might result from this step:
One of the most complete and up-to-date bibliographies on
MBO is contained in W. T. Reddin's book Effective Management
by Objectives: the 3-D Method, McGraw-Hill^ New York, 1971.
19

maintain share of the market at 15 percent
increase return on investment by 3 percent over last
year's 10 percent
meet federal environmental pollution standards by
1975
consolidate overseas holdings to four major sites
by 1976
implement fully automated facilities at each major
coastal entry point by 1974.
2. Discuss objectives at middle management level.
Once broad objectives are established, the middle managers
meet with top management to discuss the objectives as they apply
to the middle managers' functional areas. They insure that the
objectives they develop themselves are in line with and support the
broad overall objectives. The team approach is recommended at
this level to insure coordination between managers and clarity of
individual responsibilities as they apply to overall objectives.
These two steps may vary considerably depending on the
nature of the activity and the level at which MBO is being applied.
For example, in implementing MBO at the top of a large organiza-
tion, it may have been determined that productivity may be adversely
affected by a loss of a key overseas raw materials source. This
would require a different level of assessment and direction of plan-
ning than in an MBO application aimed at the receiving and shipping
department of a retailing firm suffering an abundance of customer
complaints about lost, late or damaged deliveries.
20

3. Creating the individual manager's objectives
The manager, with the assistance of the MBO advisor,
begins developing his individual objectives by using a procedure
known as Key Results Analysis [Humble, 1970], Key results analysis
(KRA) is a useful way to get the manager to analyze his key tasks
(which support the objectives derived in steps 3 and 4), performance
standards, and control information. This analysis requires the man-
ager to consider the main purpose of his job (what his job function is),
his position in the organization, scope of his job, his personal
activities, and limits of authority. This reevaluation of the man-
ager's job through KRA is primarily done because normal job
definitions are usually too long and too general, describe activities
rather than results and may be obsolete, at least in part. Two
forms, the Job Analysis Sheet and Key Result Areas Sheet are
used by Humble as the means for documenting the results of the
KRA. Together these two forms comprise the Management Guide
and are the only paperwork necessary in the MBO process. There
is normally only one Job Analysis Sheet and as many Key Result
Area Sheets as are required to document the major responsibilities




4. Conducting the Initial Performance Review
Having completed his Management Guide, the manager meets
with his supervisor to discuss the manager's objectives. This
provides the opportunity for frank and open discussions of the
manager's personal objectives and views in relation to those of the
organization. The superior provides guidance in meshing the
manager's personal and company objectives. When both agree to
language and content of the management guide, the manager's per-
formance can be assessed objectively when reviewing the guide at
a later pre-set date.
5. Conducting the follow-up reviews
After the initial review, the manager and his superior
meet at regular intervals to assess the manager's objectives.
This provides an opportunity to change or establish new objectives,
and to provide an opportunity to discuss job improvements rec-
ommended by the manager.
We believe almost every MBO program should contain these
steps with variations in the introduction and implementation phase
suited to the organization. Even with the different emphasis and
points of view observed throughout the literature, Reddin [1971]
indicates that common key elements in MBO as a system can be
identified in most applications and discussions. He lists these




Objectives Established for Positions: MBO is based
squarely on setting objectives for managerial
positions.
Use of Joint Objectives Settings: Most MBO systems
employ some kind of joint objective setting. Both
superior and subordinate participate in the objective-
setting process.
Linking of Objectives: Some form of linking of objec-
tives is part of all MBO systems, e. g. , if marketing
has an objective of selling 100, 000 units, production
has an objective of producing 100, 000 units.
Emphasis on Measurement and Control: If an objec-
tive cannot be measured, its attainment cannot be
known. If an objective cannot be subject to control,
it is simply a prediction and not an objective. How-
ever, few systems go as far as to say, 'If you can't
measure it, forget it'.
Establishment of a Review and Recycle System: All
MBO systems have some form of review of progress
toward objectives, some action is taken, and then
new objectives are set for the next period. The
review is always between the superior and the
subordinate.
High Superior Involvement: Most MBO systems in-
volve the superior more than the subordinate.
High Staff Support in Early Stages: Few organiza-
tions are so well designed to have managers so
well trained that MBO can be put in without train-
1 o
ed staff support.
These elements represent the common thread in MBO and can be
observed in most applications as indicated to us throughout the
literaUire.
1 2 Reddin, W. J.
,
Effective Management By Objectives: The
3-D Method of MBO, p. 13-15, McGraw-Hill, 1971.
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In our study of the communications station, we felt that Rumble's
emphasis on taking a fresh look at the organization as a whole and
examining the reasons for its existence [Humble, 1970] would
provide the best approach for implementing MBO.
C. IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVES
It is iinportant to discuss objectives in more detail because they
represent the focal point of the MBO process. They arc not well
understood and are misused by many managers and, according to
Reddin [1971], even by some MBO writers. Quite often targets or
goals used by managers are described with words or phrases such
as "reasonable, " "adequate, " "minimum delay, " "maximum effec-
tiveness", "prompt, " "occasional, " "with only minor errors, "
[Reddin, 1971; Humble /BNA Films, 1970]. This kind of language
does not constitute workable targets since the language does not
allow measurements. An objective is a target only to the extent that
it can be clearly perceived and measured. By using quantitative
measurements, e. g. , in the form of ratios, or other specific
measurements such as quality, cost and time, only then are
meaningful objectives possible.
D. REVIEW OF SELECTED MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES
APPLICATIONS
The literature reveals that MBO is functioning successfully in
a variety of commercial (indtistrial) organizations, covering such
24

activities as manufacturing, processing, research and development
and services (Appendix B). Several examples of such applications
are reviewed in this section to illustrate the wide range of applicability
of MBO.
From an application in a manufacturing and merchandizing firm
of tableware the following results were observed from company
personnel:
Frankly, when management by objectives was first put
over, people were afraid it was a critical measurement
rather than an aid. The job analysis followed by the
setting of objectives got rid of the grey edges of activity.
It exposed a lot of weaknesses in the managers, myself
included, but also showed our strengths; mainly that it
was really possible to control one's operation knowing
exactly what was happening and what progress we were
making on a daily basis.
Looking at a different application, the results of applying MBO
in a research and development activity indicated that few of the ideas
or suggestions arising from the application are new. According to
Humble [1970], the reason that they have not been applied before in
the R&D case is that although most everyone is aware of these ideas,
they are not that simple to apply, needing both time and collective
willingness and concentration. Heavy pressures from the top for
progress on the job results in difficulties in getting people to define
precisely what the job consists of, how it is to be done and who is to
13 Humble, J. W.
,
(Ed. ), Management by Objectives in Action,
p. 84, McGraw-Hill, 1970.
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do what. The application of MBO, in this instance, introduced
systematic thought and direction to the R&D activity:
It has been found that, in practice, it does make the
individual think through his job and show him opportu-
nities for improvement, as well as providing him with
a better understanding of how his tasks relate to others.
It gives an individual ideas of how to help the members
of his team to be more effective. Further, it provides
an opportunity to try to relate performance standards
to overall objectives, especially in the sense that it
sharpens up the criteria of acceptance of work into an
R and D department, the definition of the customer of
the work, and by what standards the customer will be
satisfied with the results achieved. Above all, it is
important to realize that success in R and D is depend-
ent on people -- on their intellectual capability, on
their appreciation of objectives, and on their behavior
as a working group. The main conclusion to be drawn
is the need for a greater awareness of the importance
of information and events leading to the decisions to
proceed to the next stage of work rather than in the
mechanistic efficiency of doing the work.
By contrast, MBO has experienced practical problems in some
applications due, for example, to a decline in enthusiasm and failure
to use the whole program cycle. Tosi and Carroll's [1970] empirical
study based on in-depth interviews with 48 managers of a large
manufacturing firm illustrates this problem. The interrelationship
between satisfaction with MBO and the feedback areas of the review
process is shown to be statistically very high, with correlations of
r = .42. When the complete MBO cycle was accomplished with





when the reviews were considered weak or were incomplete, satisfac-
tion with MBO dropped significantly. There was a pressing need
exhibited on the managers' part for feedback - to "know where they
stood" - which had not occurred due to poor or infrequent reviews.
Tosi and Carroll feel that the full benefit of MBO did not occur,
which might have, had the planning and review cycle been completed.
Another interesting application of MBO is that pursued by the
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company. In discussion with one
of its personnel officers, it was learned that the application of MBO
is left to the decision of the Regional Manager. The actual figure is
unknown but it is estimated that a majority of these managers are
using MBO at their level of the organization (middle management).
Additionally, it was learned that Pacific Telephone uses the
Assessment Center technique (Appendix A) for recommending and
selecting personnel to higher managerial levels in conjunction with
the objective performance appraisal element of MBO.
The three MBO applications in government or military organiza-
tions that were covered in the literature discuss programs in the
Royal Naval Supply and Transport Service (RNSTS) of the Ministry
of Defense (British Royal Navy) [Humble, 1970], the Career Manage-
ment and Planning Branch of the Office of Civilian Manpower and
Management (OCMM) [Cirillo, 1%8], and the Naval Supply Center,
27

San Diego, of the Naval Material Command (still in the implementation
stage). 15
All three of these MBO applications deal with civilian middle
and top level managerial levels in non-operational activities. As
applied to a supply operation, the RNSTS MBO program has been
considered fairly successful from both the operational (savings and
efficiency) and personnel (training, development and morale) areas
[Humble, 1970]. It had been implemented on a team basis to provide
a new set of unit objectives at various levels for further break down
into individual manager key areas of responsibility.
The OCMM MBO program was largely confined to only a few
managers at the top management level (GS-15 and up) emphasizing
planning and broad program objectives [Cirillo, 1968].
The San Diego program known as project PUMP - Personnel
Upward Mobility Program - involves a combination of both MBO
and "Group Appraisal" techniques combined to provide a Manage-
ment Development Program for the Naval Regional Finance Center
and the Naval Supply Center. The program has several objectives,
one of which is to strengthen the line organization in such matters
as communication and efficiency through greater under standing





W. Githens and G. Musgrave, "Personnel
Development and Evaluation System", U. S. Naval Postgraduate
School, Technical Report, Forthcoming.
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goals with organizational goals. Part of the theory behind PUMP
is that it will motivate and develop lower level managers within
the Supply Corps civilian ranks to fill the unusually large numbers
of vacancies that are anticipated when a large percentage of senior
civilian managers reach retirement age at approximately the same
time. This is a similar problem as outlined by Rear Admiral Gravely
in the introduction of this thesis.
D. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISMS OF MANAGEMENT BY
OBJECTIVES
Acceptance of MBO is not automatic. This section examines
some of the reasons for the resistance and the misunderstandings
which MBO systems have encoiintered and offers some suggestions
to remedy the problems.
Excessive Paperwork. Often too much paperwork is generated
in documenting the MBO process by overzealoiis managers to the
detriment of the program acceptance at lower levels [Raia, 1969;
Tosi and Carroll, 1968]. This is contrary to the procedures
explained by Humble and others who assert that a minimum amount
of paperwork or documentation is necessary. Representative
procedures recommended by Humble and Reddin require only one
document to record objectives and their associated standards and
control information. Only two copies are needed between superior
and subordinate and extra copies will simply fill files [Reddin, 1971].
29

Difficulty in Setting Staff Objectives . Both Oberg [1972] and Gill
and Molander [1970] state that it is difficult to arrive at acceptable
objectives for staff members. This is because staff results often
depend on the cooperation of line managers and supervisors, thus
indicating the difficulty in measuring an individual's performance in
areas he cannot control directly. Levinson [1970] supports this
argument from the impact of social and organizational factors and
states that the more a man's effectiveness depends on what other
people do, the less he himself can be held responsible for the outcome
of his efforts. However, MBO can provide the staff member the
opportunity to visualize his function more clearly and measure his
contributions to the organization [McConkey, 1972]. It just takes
more effort. As McConkey illustrates, structuring staff objectives
differently from line objectives in terms of number, length, time,
and number of progress reviews will result in more meaningful
objectives. For example, a staff member may have a greater number
of objectives than a line manager because of the multiplicity of
accountabilities within the staff position [McConkey, 1972]. By
associating these accountabilities by project or function and identify-
ing any relationship to specific line areas, the staff member can
participate in joint line- staff discussions on objectives and know
exactly where he stands.
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Suboptimization. Although this is one problem MBO is designed
to prevent, it reportedly occurs in MBO programs according to
Levinson, Raia and others. Suboptimization refers to pursuing one
goal at the expense of another of equal or greater importance.
Suboptimization in an MBO process comes from an overemphasis
on production or measurement of goals resulting in quality of perform-
ance losing out to quantification [Levinson, 1970; Raia, 1969; and
Tosi and Carroll, 1968], and when short term goals become det-
rimental to long term profitability because rewards encourage individ-
ual achievement now rather than in some distant future [Gill and
Molander, 1970]. These two instances occur, however, because the
basic elements of MBO have been neglected. In the first case,
production goals (quantity) were not tied in with quality assurance
goals indicating that a thorough analysis of the entire production
process had not been conducted or possibly its relation to causes for
loss of sales had not been examined. In the second case, short term
goals were obviously not developed from long range objectives for
profitability, otherwise the long range objectives would have been
met as the short term were completed. Rewards for achieving
objectives (short or long term) are necessarily independent from
the time element of objectives if the periodic reviews are held




Lack of Inter-Manager Cooperation. It is felt by some that
precise defining of objectives in the MBO process leads to stifling
of cooperation in multifunctional ideas and to intergroup competition.
That is to say that objectives
. .
. are set on a managerial - subordinate basis with
little reference to the targets which are set for other
managers or those which are laid down as organiza-
tional objectives. °
This leaves some critics to believe that both the processes of setting
objectives and the appraisal review offer little towards development
of teamwork between departments which in turn lessens control of
the organization [Levinson, 1970].
The problem here is mainly one of using MBO to force the
organization structure and interpersonal relationships into only a
one-on-one basis while ignoring the proven ability of MBO for getting
individuals coordinated into a unity of action [Mali, 1972], When
functional roles or interdepartmental activity within an organization
are necessarily interdependent and closely related, and we submit
that this is the most common case, then it should follow that objectives
must be set on a group basis [Gill and Molander, 1970; Gellerman,
1968; Levinson, 1970], Setting objectives by relevant groups of
subordinates in conjunction with their superior clarifies the
Gill, J. and Molander, C. F.
,
"Beyond Management
By Objectives, " Personnel Management, July 1970, p. 18-20,
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responsibility of each individual. In the same manner, the superior's
own objectives could be set on the same basis [Gill and Molander,
1970]. This argument is supported by March and Simon in the
development of their hypothesis on perceived goalsharing:
1. The greater the extent to which goals are
perceived as shared among members of a
group, the stronger the propensity of the
individual to identify with the group.
2. The stronger the propensity of the individual
to identify with the group, the less the amount
of competition between the members of a group
and an individual. * '
Reddin [1971] supports the group or team approach in all MBO
applications in order to gain clarity of individual responsibilities.
Quantifying Goals Stifles Individual Self- Control. Forcing
subordinates to quantify goals defeats the purpose of MBO by not
allowing them to exercise self-control [ivancevich, et al, 1970] and
once objectives are set, little is left for areas of discretion [Levinson,
1970]. However, while it is sometimes difficult to set precise objec-
tives, an objective is only useful if its attainment is measurable.
Conversely, if it is not measurable, it is impossible to determine
whether the objective has been reached [Reddin, 1971]. Actually,
this criticism misses the point of MBO completely, bccaxise according
to Drucker [1954], the greatest advantage of managing by objectives
17 March, J. G. and Simon, H. A., Organizations, p. 66,
John Wiley & Sons, 1958.
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is the personal involvement of the subordinate in goal setting which
actually allows him to exhibit self-control over his own performance.
Objectivity Cannot be Maintained in Rating. Gellerman, in his
book Management by Motivation [1968], considers it difficult to be
objective in rating an individual. Part of his argument is that objec-
tives or goals cannot be set well enough to measure an individual's
performance, a point which has been discussed in the previous
paragraph. Mainly, he sees the problem as a conflict between the
immediate needs of the rater's job (i. e. , rating) and the long range
interest of the organization because often the rater insures his own
success by attempting to motivate the ratee by overrating his perforin,
ance rather than measuring his work objectively [Gellerman, 1968].
Levinson supports this position, believing that objectivity is a "vain
plea" because every subordinate is tied directly to his superior's
efforts to achieve his own goals and thus the subordinate will be
appraised on how well he supports his superior [Levinson, 1970].
Through proper implementation, MBO addresses the relation-
ship between "rating" (the evaluation of individual performance) and
"managing" through the performance appraisal phase. There should
be no conflict if the supervisor has agreed, during the objectives
setting phase, that what the subordinate is accountable for supports
those objectives of the supervisor and the organization in an accurate
and meaningful way [Mali, 1972]. As a rater, he then enjoys the
opportunity to use resultant, accurate data as the basis for his
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appraisal. Motivation is assured when the rater enjoys participation
in and commitment to those performance requirements in which he is
involved, and not when receiving an inflated rating, which he knows
to be false.
Organizational versus Individual Needs. The one obvious stress
point in the entire MBO process is the relationship between individual
and organizational goals. Just how sensitive does the organization
have to be towards the individual's needs? Levinson states that
.... to place consideration of the managers' personal
objectives first does not minimize the importance of
the organization's goals. It does not mean there is
anything wrong with the organization's need to increase
its return on investment, its size, its productivity or
its other goals. * °
Levinson focuses the responsibility of bringing the two sides together
squarely on the organization with the first step being that of under-
standing the individxxal's needs and then, with him, assuring how they
can be achieved while in pursuit of the organization's needs. Much
of the success attributed to a working MBO system rests on the
accomplishment of aligning the needs of the individual with the
organization's [Mali, 1972]. McGregor suggests that a proper role
for the superior is:
helping the subordinate relate his career planning to
the needs and realities of the organization. In the
discussions (on objective setting) the boss can use





"Management by Whose Objectives? " Harvard
Business Review
, p. 125-134, July-August 1970.
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subordinate establish targets and methods for achiev-
ing them which will (a) lead to increased knowledge
and skill, (b) contribute to organizational objectives,
and (c) test the subordinate's appraisal of himself.
This is help which the subordinate wants. He knows
well that the rewards and satisfaction he seeks from
his career as a manager depend on his contribution to
organizational objectives. He is also aware that the
superior knows more completely than he what is
required for success in this organization and under
this boss. The superior, then, is the person who can
help him test the soundness of his goals and his plans
for achieving them. 19
Summary. The vast majority of the authors read realize
some of the difficulties highlighted in this section do exist, yet feel
the effort required to overcome them is well worth it to gain the
advantages MBO brings to an organization.
The recent trends in industry and government towards more
effective management of the human resources have led to many
changes. As a catalyst for change, MBO appears as a fulcrum for
any turnabout of management philosophy. Blau [Litterer, 1969]
comes closest in placing his finger on the central issue when he say
that evaluation on the basis of standards that specify results to be
'McGregor, D.
,
An Uneasy Look at Performance Appraisal, "
Harvard Bu siness Review, p. 89-94, May-June 1957.
Optimizing Human Resources, Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co., (1971) edited by Lippitt. This and Bidwell, is an excellent
collection of readings on human resources development that
highlights the change in orientation of personnel management to
meet the trends in society and the needs of changing organizations.
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accomplished "constrains" employees to discipline themselves and
eliminates close supervision. Many of the problems discussed above
occur due to a lack of understanding of the philosophy behind the MBO
process. In introducing the concept of MBO Drucker emphasized
this point and cautioned awareness of these problems. His concern
was that MBO has far reaching effects and may produce undesirable
changes through insufficient awareness of this fact. Mali states
that the companies that have had successful results with the strategy
of MBO overcame similar difficulties encountered above because
their supervisors and managers were not only fully aware of the
MBO rationale and procedure, but also willing to put forth the effort
and time needed to make it work [Mali, 1972].
Any movement towards an objectives -oriented system most
likely constitutes a fundamental change in managerial orientation and
style which may also call for alterations within the organization
[Tosi and Carroll, 1968]. Gill and Molander support this view and
suggest that:
MBO is best placed in context if regarded as one of a
number of useful analytical techniques whereby the
organization might take a good look at itself. Any
claim that it may have to be a recipe for complete











III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE
As discussed earlier the performance objectives established by
the MBO process can either focus upon individuals or groups of
individuals working within the same functional unit. The purpose of
this chapter is to discuss the organizational structure of a typical
communications station, the determination of which approach (individ-
ual versus group) would be best, and the development of an MBO
implementation plan to best suit the needs of the communications
organization. Although our initial approach was directed at the basic
communications station organization at the department head level
using individual-oriented objectives, unforeseen factors later indicated
that the group-oriented objective approach at the Communications
Department level would be more productive.
A. DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS STATION ORGANIZATION
As an activity of the Naval Communications Command, the U. S.
Naval Communications Station San Francisco's stated mission is
".
. . . to manage, operate, and maintain those facilities, equipment,
devices and systems necessary to provide requisite communications
22
. . . .
" To fulfill this mission, the Naval Communications Station




San Francisco is patterned along functional lines, with eight depart-
ment heads reporting to the commanding officer via the executive
officer. The eight departments are: Operations, Plans, Com-
munications, Administration, Supply, CAMS (Communications Area
23
Master Station), Security, and Public Works.
The functional responsibilities of the five department heads to
be included in this study are:
1. "Operations - coordinates operations of all general
service communi cation elements of the command,
and, as the principal communications /electronics
advisor to the Commanding Officer, promulgates
maintenance, operational, and training policies for
the command.
2. Plans - provides research and coordination for future
plans and a source of information on projects.
3. Communications - responsible, under the Command-
ing Officer, for the accomplishment of the assigned
mission of the station.
4. Administrative - responsible, under the Comanding
Officer, for the administrative matters of the
station . . .
5. Supply - responsible, under the Commanding Officer,
for procuring, receiving, storing, issuing, trans-
ferring, accounting for, and, while in his custody,
maintaining all stores of the command ..."
(A more detailed statement of these responsibilities can be found in
NAVCOMMSTA SFRAN INST. 5450. 2D of 1 August 1972)/
-•Naval Communications Station San Francisco is different from
the "typical" naval communications station in that the last three depart
ments listed
- CAMS, Security, and Public Works _ are not usually
found at other stations, and for the purposes of this study are omitted.
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The rank structure consists of unrestricted line officers in the
billets of Commanding Officer and Executive Officer. The department
head billets are filled by unrestricted and restricted line officers
(depending upon functional areas) in the rank of commander, through
lieutenant. As is normal in a military environment, the department
heads report directly to the Commanding Officer on matters of an
operational nature, and they report to the Executive Officer on admin-
istrative and non-operational matters.
There are also several civilian "communications specialists"
(GS-12 through GS-9) attached to the organization who work in staff/
advisory positions to their respective department heads.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic organizational structure of the































ORGANIZATION CHART - U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION SAN FRANCISCO
Fi gu r e 1
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B. INITIALLY PLANNED IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE
The initial application of MBO was directed at the basic com-
munications station organization down through the department head
level, and, within the Communications Department, down to the
division officer level. Personnel participating were to include ten
military managers (captain through warrant officer) and seven civilian
managers (GS-12 through GS-9).
There were several reasons for selecting the respective depart-
ments and the military and civilian managers as participants in the
implementation process. First, the outputs of the departments
included both qualitative and quantitative products. For example,
the outputs of both the Administration and Plans Departments are
qualitative in nature. The Administration Department is primarily
concerned with personnel policies, and the Plans Department focuses
mainly on long-range plans, policies, etc. On the other hand, the
Communications Department is oriented to a quantitative output, and
is primarily concerned with the operational requirement of maximizing
the number of messages processed consistent with an acceptable
loss/delay rate.
Another important consideration was the depth of the implementa-
tion process within the level of organization. In establishing an MBO
prograin within an organization, Reddin [197 1] recommends that only
the first three levels of management be included in the initial phase.
Reddin's premise is that the top three management levels should be
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thoroughly indoctrinated and become familiar with MBO prior to
its implementation at the lower management levels. In this regard,
the civilian communications specialists, although not serving in
line management functions, would be considered as the "third
management level" for the implementation process. Similarly, as
illustrated in Figure 1, the division officers within the Communica-
tions Department represent the third level of line managers.
A third reason for selecting the participants was because there
exists a dichotomy between the line and staff functions which each
manager performs, and which is also a military and civilian dichotomy.
In this organization, all of the civilian managers serve in staff
positions as advisors to the line (military) managers. In this
respect, the intent was to see if civilian managers in the staff
positions could effectively establish their own objectives to support
their line manager's objectives.
C. USE OF MBO ADVISORS
During selection of the participating managers, and prior to the
implementation planning phase, both Humble and Reddin strongly
recommend the use of MBO advisors. Although MBO is primarily
the concern of the participating managers, there exists a definite
need for a trained advisor who acts, as Frean states, as a catalyst
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to original thought. Frean, in his article, "Training MBO
*y a
Advisors", " sees the role of the advisor as assisting line manage-
ment to introduce MBO. In this respect, the establishment of precise
key result areas and key tasks for the individual managers requires
the specialized assistance of trained advisors. Another important
role of the advisor is the position he assumes during the initial
review sessions between the supervisor and his subordinate. As
Frean states it:
Having a third person present, even if he does not
participate very actively, helps to ensure that such
meetings take place in an atmosphere different from
that of normal day-to-day ones.
A third important aspect of the advisor's role is one of
coordination. Not only is he responsible for setting up and coor-
dinating the implementation schedule, he is further responsible for
establishing and coordinating all "team efforts" required to solve
mutual problems. For example, if a problem arises that affects
more than one manager or department, some type of "coordinated
effort" is necessary to identify and solve this problem. Thus, the
role of the advisor is to insure that all levels of management fully
understand and follow the principles and procedures involved in
the implementation and continuing use of MBO.
24 Frean, D. H.
,
"Training MBO Advisors. " Humble, J. W. (Ed. ),
Management by Objectives in Action






To assist the managers at the communications station, the authors
of this thesis served in the capacity of MBO advisors.
D. DESIGN OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE
The implementation procedure we designed for the communications
station was primarily based on Humble's work on MBO systems and
consists of the following six steps:
1. Introduce MBO to all participating managers;
2. Conduct Key Results Analysis (KRA) of the
organization;
3. Conduct KRA and job analysis of each manager
and establish routine goals;
4. Conduct KRA agreement sessions between
supervisor and subordinate;
5. Conduct first periodic review and reevaluation
of KRA between supervisor and subordinate, and
begin Job Improvement Plan (establishment of
innovative goals) for the subordinate;
6. Continue periodic reviews of progress and
conduct performance appraisal review.
According to leading proponents of MBO, the actual process of
implementing MBO can proceed in one of two basic directions:
(1) Establishment of organizational objectives first and subsequent
establishment of successive lower-level objectives (top-to-bottom)
or (2) Establishment of the lowest-level objectives first, and sub-
sequent establishment of successive higher-level objectives (bottom-
to-top). Both of these methods were considered in the implementa-
tion approach, and based on the assumption that lower-level units
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exist to support higher-level objectives, the top- to-bottom approach
was chosen. The rationale here is that lower-level objectives cannot
be defined until higher-level objectives are known.
E. COMPUTER SIMULATION MODEL
With the six basic implementation steps and the "top-to-bottom"
objectives -setting approach established, and prior to the formal
presentation of the project to the Commanding Officer of the com-
munications station, a computer simulation of the implementation
process was conducted in order to establish time-oriented quantita-
tive guidelines which would be helpful in the implementation process.
Specifically, it was desired to simulate the MBO implementation
procedures to determine the approximate amount of time that should
be allocated for the various steps of the implementation process,
and, using this empirical data, prepare a schedule to assist the
Commanding Officer in evaluating the time constraints of the im-
plementation procedures.
The overall objectives of the simulation were threefold:
1. To establish quantitative guidelines for use in
the actual implementation of MBO;
2. To provide a quantitative analysis of management-
level utilization of work hours directly related to
MBO;
3. To assist in determining the "priority of MBO" in
relation to other operational situations by analyzing
the frequency and length of time of interruptions to
the MBO implementation process.
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The simulation model was based on the premise that each level
of management must define its objectives in terms of the next higher-
level objectives. This is accomplished by establishing broad organiza
tional objectives and then having each level of management define its
own objectives to support the overall objectives.
As previously stated in Chapter II, the actual setting of objectives
can be pursued in two different approaches. The first approach is to
establish objectives at the individual manager level [Humble, 1970],
and the second approach is to establish objectives on a group or team
level [Mali, 1972; Reddin, 1971]. This model presents both approach-
es to provide a quantitative time comparison based upon similar
input distributions.
Although there arc several simulation languages available
which can be used in this model, IBM's General Purpose Simula-
2 6
tion System - GPSS/360 _ has several advantages over the other
languages. For example, it enables the user to define the "trans-
action" which moves through the simulation. In our model, the pri-
mary transaction is defined as "one complete implementation of
MBO". Other examples of a transaction include an automobile
(transaction) on a highway (system), or a customer (transaction)
in a barbershop (system).
26A complete description of IBM's GPSS/360 can be found in
Thomas J. Schriber's book, General Purpose Simulation System/360:
Introductory Concepts and Case Studies.
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A second advantage of GPSS is the user's ability to define his
own "facilities". Facility is a GPSS term for the capability of
providing service to a transaction. Each facility can accommodate
only one transaction at a time. In our MBO model, a facility is
defined as a particular level of management or an MBO advisor.
Thus, to summarize, the model's "transaction" consists of the
process of implementing MBO and it alternately "seizes and releases
several different "facilities" throughout the simulation at different
times to represent the objectives -setting meetings and review
meetings between the different management levels required in the
MBO process.
GPSS also provides for secondary model segments which run
concurrently with the main segment. Several secondary segments
are used in our model to simulate "higher priority" situations
which either delay or interrupt MBO meetings. Finally, a tertiary
model segment is used to control the timing of the transaction
movement throughout the model. In our model the basic time unit
used is the minute.
The operational organization at the communications station as
previously illustrated in Figure 1 was used in the simulation. The




1. Level 1: Commanding Officer and Executive Officer
2. Level 2: Department Heads
3. Level 3: Division Officers and all civilian managers.
This grouping of the managerial levels was done for two reasons.
First, it provided for better simulation efficiency by reducing the
number of individual management positions from 15 to 3, thereby
requiring less facilities to be named and processed throughout the
simulation. Secondly, the management levels were grouped along
the horizontal lines of the organization chart, thereby maintaining
the basic organizational hierarchy. We felt that the objectives-
setting processes of MBO would consume approximately the same
amount of time for any one of the managers within a given horizontal
management level.
The actual MBO implementation process begins at the highest
level of management and proceeds towards the lowest levels, with
the establishment of objectives at each level. Thus, the rate at
which MBO is implemented is primarily dependent upon the following
factors:
1. The amount of time required to properly introduce
MBO to all participating levels of management.
2. The availability of managerial personnel to attend
introductory group meetings, individual KRA
meetings, and KRA review meetings.
3. The amount of time required for a given manager
to define his objectives.
4. The number and length of time of higher-priority
interruptions to the MBO implementing process.
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Thus, it can be seen how the series of meetings to implement MBO
consists of scheduling and conducting several meetings between
Level 1 and Level 2 managers, and further meetings between Level 2
and Level 3 managers.
The System Flowchart (Figure 2) illustrates the basic model
segments required for the simulation. As previously described,
each transaction in Model Segment I represents one complete im-
27
plementation of MBO.
In a simulation model of this nature, the input distributions used
to approximate advances in time (to represent scheduling and con-
ducting of the meetings) are very important variables. For example,
the input distribution used to approximate the time required to
schedule a general meeting is based upon the standard normal
distribution with a mean of 16 hours or two working days (Figure 3),
with a standard deviation of one-sixth the mean, or 2.6 ho\irs. Duri ig
the simulation run, for example, the amount of time that will be
probabilistically determined from the standard normal input could
range from hours to 32 hours (1920 minutes).
On the other hand, an exponential distribution was assumed for
the interarrival times of the higher priority situations in Model
Segment II. Specifically, an exponential arrival-time distribution
27 A complete program listing, along with the model assumptions
and the input distributions, are listed in Appendix E and the computer
printed listing at the end of this thesis.
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Figure 3
implies that the probability of the next arrival is the same regardless
of how many arrivals have occurred in the past.
A summary of the simulation results, based upon the assumed
input distributions, is as follows: The amount of time required to
implement MBO varied between 67 and 112 8-hour workdays, or
about an average of 17 weeks. This means that if an organization
of approximately 15 managers in three management levels commenced
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implementing MBO, it would take them about an average of 85 days
to complete the process. This total time includes all the time lost
in scheduling group meetings, etc.
During the implementation period, the three management levels
could be expected to devote between 2 percent (Level 1) and 3 percent
(Levels 2 and 3) of their time directly to the implementation process.
The simulation results further showed that the lengths of the
MBO meetings varied approximately between 90 and 120 minutes,
and of the meetings interrupted by higher-priority situations,
50 percent were for 20 mimites or less and 63 percent were for 30
minutes or less.
One of the critical qualitative aspects of the implementation is
the Key Results Analysis (Appendix C), and this appeared also to be
the critical quantitative aspect of the simulation. For example,
in an actual implementation, the ability of a manager to understand
the principles of MBO and then apply these principles in analyzing
his own job is a critical step in the implementation. If a manager
has difficulty in defining his KRA, then additional time and guidance
will be required. Similarly, the simulation results indicate that it
took 2!2 to 8 working days for a manager to complete his KRA. This
is not to say that it took a manager 2^ to 8 full working days of his
schedule to complete his KRA. What it does mean is that a manager,
over a period of days, spent an hour or two actually writing out his
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KRA, and then gave additional thought to it over the next couple of days
until he was satisfied with his KRA was correct.
The results of this simulation thus became the basis for planning
the actual implementation schedule, and also illustrated to the partic-
ipating managers approximately how much of their time would be
devoted directly to the implementation process.
For example, based upon the above results, the following
scheduling guidelines were used:
1. At least seven working days was allowed each
manager to complete his KRA.
2. A minimum of two hours was scheduled for each
meeting.
3. Interrupted meetings would not be cancelled, and
would continue when the interrtiption terminated.
These guidelines were chosen for several reasons. First, to
coordinate our implementation plan with our academic schedules, w
could only work with the managers one day each week, thus facilitat: \g
the seven working days allowed a manager to complete his KRA.
Secondly, although the simulation results indicate that the MBO
meetings would range in length from 90 to 120 minutes, the higher
time limit was selected as the schedule guideline to ensure ample
time was available for the meetings, and third, since the simulation
results indicate that about 63 percent of the interruptions were for
30 minutes or less, we felt that it would be better to temporarily
delay a meeting rather than reschedule it.
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The group or team approach to the implementation process was
also modeled, and the System Flowchart is shown in Figure 4.
The basic difference between the individual and team implementa-
tion procedures is that the MBO advisor either assists the individual
managers in establishing their objectives, or the advisor works with
functional units or teams of managers to establish unit objectives.
The result of team implementation is that there are fewer MBO
meetings, but the meetings are usually longer.
The team approach model is based upon the same organization
and management levels as presented in Figure 1 and mainly differs
from the individual approach model in the number and type (team
versus individual) of MBO meetings. However, in the team approach
individual managers are not required to prepare their own Manage-
ment Guides, and this accounts for a tremendous implementation
time variance between the two models.
For example, the results of the team approach indicate that over-
all implementation time is between 25 and 30 eight-hour workdays, or
approximately one -third the implementation time of the individual
approach. The lengths of the team meetings, as expected, averaged
about an hour longer (2?2 to 3 hours vice \\ to 2 hours), however, the
2 R
scheduling and interruptions time factors were about the same.
28A complete program listing, along with the model assumptions
and the input distributions, are listed in Appendix E and the computer
printed listing at the end of this thesis.
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE USED
Although the development of oxir initial plan focused on the com-
munications station organization with individual-oriented objectives,
the final implementation plan focused on the Communications Depart-
ment organization with team-oriented objectives. The reasons behind
these changes are discussed, and the final implementation plan develop-
ed for the department is presented. Also, a brief discussion of
OCMM's Civilian Personnel Management Self- Evaluation Survey is
presented as a possible method to measure the effect of any changes
in "managerial effectiveness" due to MBO.
A. MEASUREMENT OF POSSIBLE INCREASED MANAGERIAL
EFFECTIVENESS
In an attempt to investigate the possibility that the MBO manage-
ment system might provide the iinpetus for increased managerial
effectiveness, the Self- Evaluation Survey was administered to the
personnel at the communications station prior to the start of the
implementation process. We intended to readminister the same
survey during the last phase of the project to determine if there was
a change in managerial effectiveness. However, we were unable to
readminister the survey in sufficient time to include a before-and-
after analysis in this thesis. Our Thesis Advisor will conduct the
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analysis when the results of the second survey are available.
This before-and-after evaluation is to be conducted by using a survey
designed and provided by the Program Evaluation Branch of the Office
of Civilian Manpower Management (OCMM). ' The survey consists
of a self-administered questionnaire which is designed to provide
Navy activities the means for evaluating the effectiveness of their
personnel management programs. The questionnaire consists of






4. Equal Employment Opportunities
5. Classification and Pay
6. Position Management





The survey statements are designed to measure employees' and
supervisors' attitudes towards the eleven program areas and are
divided into two forms for this purpose. Separate surveys for
employees and supervisors are issued in booklet form. The 65
statements have been developed to avoid personnelist jargon and to
orient the language to the respondent's point of view so that the short
^"jvlasse, S.
,
"The Questionnaire Survey Technique, "




statements can be responded to by indicating "yes, " "no" or "un-
decided" on a separate answer sheet. For example, a typical state-
ment for an employee response in the area of communi cations is:
"I ain told promptly v/hen there is a change in policy, rules or
regulations that affect me. " In the same area, the supervisory
booklet has the statement: "I notify my employees in advance of
changes that will affect them. " It is through analysis and comparison
of the responses of both supervisors and employees that observations
on management effectiveness are obtained.
Since wage grade workers near the retirement age may view
some personnel programs quite differently from young white-collar
workers, an analysis of the replies should be able to provide useful
information for possible future action. Subsequently, although a
person's responses are anonymous, the questionnaire requests
essential identifying biographical data on each participant, such as
age, length of service, blue collar or white collar worker, etc.
,
and
this type of information can be important in assessing program
effectiveness
.
Since the intent of the questionnaire was to attempt to measure
any change in managerial and employee attiUides due to a change in
their "working environment" and to further validate the usefulness
of the questionnaire in determining before and after managerial
effectiveness, a control group outside the communications department
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was used to establish a reference for measuring changes in
effectiveness.
B. COMMAND INDOCTRINATION AND PROJECT ACCEPTANCE
The first phase of the indoctrination began with a formal presenta.
tion to the Commanding Officer. This presentation was designed to
introduce the basic principles of MBO and to answer any questions
regarding MBO's usefulness in an operational environment.
The major part of the presentation consisted of showing three
30
films which explained the basics of MBO. The films dealt broadly
in the areas of an organization establishing its long-range objectives,
the need of a manager to properly define his job, and the importance
which should be placed upon proper performance appraisal and man-
agerial development. This three-film introduction provided the Com-
manding Officer with general knowledge and specific facts on how
management by objectives is being applied in the business world.
After viewing the films, the proposed MBO implementation
package was outlined to the Commanding Officer, along with recom-
mendations that five of his eight departments participate. It was
suggested that these five departments were the typical departments
Humble's MBO-system includes a series of six films which
are designed to assist in the introduction and implementation of
the MBO management system. These films are distributed by
BNA Films, 5615 Fishers Lane, Rockville, Maryland, 20852,
under the title, "The Humble MBO Film Series. "
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at a comrrrunications station, and further that the fifteen managers
involved provided a broad range of military and civilian managerial
experience to work with.
At the conclusion of the presentation, the Commanding Officer
voiced concern over the broad scope of the pilot project, and suggested
a more detailed approach be made with a smaller number of partic-
ipants. He further suggested that since the output of the Communica-
tions Department has the most noticeable effect on the day-to-day
operations of the communications station, he wovild prefer to see
MBO implemented within the Communications Department. More
specifically, he was concerned with the benefits to be accrued in
the short run; that is, how MBO would help him to eliminate the
day-to-day "brush-fires", while at the same time improve the
overall effectiveness of the communications station. Our reply was
forthright. MBO is not intended to replace their present management
system, but rather to introduce a new dimension - planning - to
their present system. With proper application of the analysis and
job improvement aspects of the MBO system, combined with top-
management guidance and interest at each management level, sub-
ordinate managers are encouraged to investigate potential problem
areas prior to their occurrence, and offer suggestions for improvement.
Although the Commanding Officer authorized us to proceed with
the MBO project, it was on a much narrower scope than we anticipated.
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Our main concern at this point was whether or not effective top-
management support would be evident to the participating managers
within the Communications Department. The Commanding Officer
indicated that he did not desire to establish any objectives at his
level to preclude the possibility of "suppressing" any initiative on the
part of the participating managers.
Fortunately, no changes in the implementation process were
required, and the project was to proceed according to the original
six steps as previously defined.
The participating managers now included the following: 11 mil-
itary managers in the rank of lieutenant commander through chief
petty officer, and 4 civilian managers, GS-11 through GS-7. We
were concerned whether or not the lower-level military and civilian
managers could contribute useful ideas during the implementation
process, and also how much benefit they would receive from the
project. We believe this aspect of the project ultimately depends on
how much an individual manager could disassociate himself from the
"inputs" of his job and concentrate on the "outputs" of his job. For
example, a manager's "job input" might be to "maintain equipment
in a high state of readiness," wherein his "job output" would in
reality be defined as "equipment availability maintained at 95 percent. "
This job output is readily measurable and can be equated to a specific
organizational objective, as well as provide an "area of improvement. "
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C. DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES USED
The general introduction of MBO to the participating managers
of the Comixmnications Department proceeded in the same manner as
the introductory presentation to the Commanding Officer. However,
at this meeting, only the two Humble films pertaining to establishing
long-range objectives and defining the manager's job were shown.
The third film on performance appraisal and managerial development
was not shown at this time since the performance appraisal aspect
of MBO comes much later in the implementation process, and after
viewing the first two films during the first hour, the group's atten-
tiveness was less than desired.
During the discussion period that followed, a notebook entitled
the "Management Guide" was distributed to each manager (Appendix D),
The Humble-MBO system recommends development of The Manage-
ment Guide, and, later on, The Job Improvement Plan for each
manager. The Management Guide consists of two separate forms,
the first of which identifies the manager, his position, and the overall
scope and purpose of his job. The second part of the Management
Guide is provided to assist the individual manager in establishing his




Briefly, Key Result Areas are those 20 percent of the tasks that
take up 80 percent of a manager's time.
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Included in the notebook along with the Management Guide was a
six-page descriptive handout which provided each manager with
definitions and examples to assist him in preparing his Management
Guide. Although the final form of the Management Guide would be
prepared with the assistance of an advisor, it was felt that each
manager would have a sufficient knowledge of MBO from the films
and discussion period, along with the Management Guide handout,
to initially prepare his own Management Guide.
To assist in coordinating the implementation procedures and
scheduling of meetings, a critical path schedule was prodticed as
shown in Appendix D. This schedule listed billets, dates, and times
for KRA meetings with advisors and for KRA review meetings with
supervisors. The purpose of the schedule was to: (1) Monitor the
overall progress of the implementation procedures; (2) Advise all
managers of their respective meetings; (3) Prevent undue delay in
scheduling of the meetings; and (4) Define the critical path and pin-
point any future meeting schedules which may overburden a managei
in a given period of days.
During the initial phase of the implementation procedures in
which we reviewed the Management Guide with individual managers,
it became quite evident that the average manager could not easily
disassociate himself from his job to take an objective look at it.
For example, when asked to define "the overall scope and purpose of
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his job, " one manager very readily drew upon his many years of
military experience and produced a detailed outline (two pages) of
every aspect of his job, when only a brief statement on the overall
scope and purpose was desired. In this instance, although written
without the aid of an organizational manual, the subordinate manager
listed every aspect of his job in the standard format (duties, respon-
sibility, authority) of a military organization manual. Inasmuch as
MBO is predicated on only those things which a manager has to do
well in order to succeed, only those job functions important to the
job should be listed.
Based upon the group response of the first introductory meetings,
and our initial advisor-manager sessions, we decided to alter the
implementation procedure from the one-on-one advisor-to-manager
approach to the "team approach". This decision was brought about
by several factors. First, during the initial meetings the managers
were having a difficult time understanding the need to look at their
jobs from a different approach; that is, they felt they were doing a
"successful" job now so why change? Second, the various replies
in group sessions encouraged more participation from all those
present. And, third, the managers, especially on the military side,




3 1As stated previously the group or team approach includes the
use of small groups of managers to conduct a Key Results Analysis
of their unit, and then systematically develop their unit objectives.
We looked for the group participation approach to the MBO process
to foster an increased awareness in each manager to more objectively
look at his job in relation to the unit's objectives. As Reddin puts
it, among the outputs of a team objectives meeting are:
1. The team role is better defined.
2. Managerial effectiveness areas are established.
3. Team decision making is improved.
4. Motivation increases sharply.
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5. Individual jobs are enriched.
The implementation approach was therefore revised as follows:
1. Conduct departmental-level group Key Results
Analysis of the department.
2. Through group effort, establish objectives for the
department, and determine how each departmental
Key Result area is supported by divisions within
the department.
3. Conduct divisional-level group discussions to
determine Key Results Areas for each division
in support of those departmental objectives which
the division supports.
The first departmental-level group Key Results Analysis (KRA)
meeting was attended by ten managers representing the department
level and three division-level units. Attendents at this meeting
included the functional unit supervisors and their leading assistants.
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The Communications Officer began the meeting by listing three
criteria which each key result area must meet in order to be valid.
These criteria are:
1. Leads to success or failure of the organization.
2. Areas must be separable for organizational
planning.
3. Items must be quantifiable.
With these criteria listed on the blackboard, the Communications
Officer started the discussion with the suggestion of "Operational
Communications _ DCS" as a possible key result area for the
department. This KRA was originally suggested by us to the Com-
munications Officer only as an example of what a KRA might encompass,
with no intent of it becoming a final departmental KRA. A second
example of a KRA presented to the Communications Officer was
"Operational Communications - Fleet", and this suggested KRA also
appeared on the blackboard.
After much discussion, the departmental team came up with the
following seven KRA's divided into the two categories as listed:
1. Operational - Provide reliable, rapid, and secure
communications
a. Operational communications _ DCS
b. Operational communications - Navy Tactical
c. Commercial Refile








At this first objectives _ setting meeting, we participated very-
little in the establishing of the departmental KRA's. However, as
we realized during later meetings, we had to provide more guidance
than originally anticipated. If left to their own accord, the managers
had a tendency to approach certain areas in too much detail and get
bogged down on irrelevant material. In this regard, the advisor is
definitely an asset in keeping the discussions on the right track.
The group participation was much better than anticipated. Once
suggestions were made regarding possible KRA's, pros and cons
were immediately forthcoming from the group to support or change
the suggestion. On some occasions, the originator of a suggestion
acquiesced when dissenting arguments were given as to why a partic-
ular area should not be a KRA of the department.
After this first meeting, the KRA's established were analyzed
by us and the Communications Officer and it was determined that
all of them did not meet the criteria originally established for a
key result area, i. e.
,
relevant, independent, and measurable
(Appendix D).
Two additional department-level meetings were conducted before
acceptable KRA's were established. At these meetings, the following
ideas were suggested to the managers in order to assist in establish-
ing valid departmental key result areas:
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1. Group members were to discuss KRA's on a
departmental level vice the independent
divisional level.
2. Old Navy cliches were unacceptable as valid
KRA's ("Service to the Fleet, " "Rapid, Reliable,
and Secure Communications, " etc. ).
At the last of these two additional meetings, a completely new approach
to departmental key result areas was proposed by the advisors, and
during the final meeting, the advisors suggested approaching the
analysis by asking what it was the station did and what were the
results desired in terms of the output from the station. Key result
areas for the Communications Department could then be viewed as
contributions to this output. As a result of this clarification as to
why the Communications Department exists, the following valid




That is, the department basically does no more than receive, process,
and transmit messages.
With these key result areas established, il was less difficult to
determine Key Tasks, Performance Standards, and the Control Data
required for each Key Result Area. Figure 5 shows the complete
Key Results Analysis for the Communi cations Department.
At subsequent lower level MBO meetings, an advisor met with













































































































establish team objectives for each division in support of the depart-
mental objectives already established. During these meetings, each
division was to establish key result areas to support those depart-
mental key result areas which were a function by the output of a
division. For example, during the group Key Results Analysis for
the Technical Control Division, it became apparent that the depart-
mental key result area, "Circuit Continuity" (Items l.b, 2.b, and
3.b in Figure 5), was entirely supported by the Technical Control
Division, and this then became their primary divisional key result
areas. (Figure 6)
Since the division level managers had attended the key results
analysis of the departmental meetings, they more readily adapted







































































V. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section analyzes the results of the MBO implementation
at the communications station and lists several problem areas en-
countered which affected these results. The question whether these
problems are peculiar to the communications station environment
is addressed, followed by recommendations for future work.
A. RESULTS OF THE MBO PROJECT
Based upon our presumption that the managers participating in
the pilot project would have had more time to devote to MBO, we
had hoped to develop complete key result areas from the Communica-
tions Department and its three main divisions - Technical Control,
Fleet Center, and Electronics Maintenance. However, we only had
time to analyze operational key result areas for the dej^artment as
a whole and only one division. Further work is presently being
conducted by Communications Department personnel to complete the
implementation project.
Since lack of time prevented completing the MBO implementation,
and therefore curtailed the readministration of the Self- Evaluation
Survey (Chapter IV, Section A), only our personal observations of
any change in managerial effectiveness are presented. These
observations of the benefits derived and the problems encountered
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are based upon the comments and actions of the participants during
the various phases of the implementation project.
Although we had established specific objectives for the MBO
project, it became evident as the implementation progressed that all
the project objectives would not be attained. Obviously the difficulties
encountered with the individual approach led only to regeneration of
task-oriented job descriptions rather than results -oriented, and
individuals tended to consider their activities as fulfilling certain
tasks rather than contributing towards a higher organizational goal
or objective.
Once the team of department managers got together, it was
obvious that there was a variety of opinions as to the exact objectives
of the communications station and the communications department.
As previously stated, we suggested a route of analysis towards
clarifying the overall communications station objectives (i.e.,
reasons for its existence) with a paralle] analysis of departmental
and divisional objectives.
After several iterations of the key results analysis, the depart-
mental objectives as shown in Figure 5 were derived. However,
these represent only a portion of the key restilt areas, as the Com-
munications Officer stated that he had other key result areas in the
personnel administration and training categories which demanded
much of his time and attention. With the operational objectives
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already established, he stated that he felt better prepared to develop
the departmental administrative and training objectives. This tech-
nique of evaluating administrative and training objectives in view of
operational objectives provided him with a much better insight into
the overall scope of his department's objectives. Having also partic-
ipated in these meetings, the division managers stated that they had
a better appreciation of their division's positions and responsibilities
relative to that of the communications department.
An important step in the MBO implementation process is the
KRA review meeting. As stated earlier, the prupose of this meeting
is twofold. First, it is essential that the Communications Depart-
ment's objectives support those of the station, and secondly, by
approving the department's objectives, the Commanding Officer is
effectively stating that if these results are achieved, he will be
completely satisfied with the department's output.
The initial KRA review between the Communications Officer and
Commanding Officer covered only key result areas of operational
communications, and was considered a reasonable milestone. The
Commanding Officer agreed with the alignment of key tasks as they
supported his viewpoint on the Communications Officer's contributions
to the station's objectives. Although minor revisions or additions
were made (primarily in the Control Data area), this meeting exhibited
rather well the two-way flow of communication that is supposed to
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exist in MBO between supervisor and subordinate. For example, the
Commanding Officer felt that the Control Data "Non-delivery Acknowl-
edgment" on a missing message was a negative or after-the-fact
approach to check for missing messages. The Communications
Officer discussed the problem of presently not having enough personnel
for complete in-house message traffic verification. The Commanding
Officer agreed, and said he did not want to impose any unnecessary
checks. The Communications Officer stated he would give additional
thought to this area.
The Commanding Officer further commented that when the Com-
munications Officer addressed the personnel administration and train-
ing aspects of his key results analysis, he considered integrating
race relations into his key result areas. The Commanding Officer
considered this area to be of prime importance and felt that an MBO
analysis would provide direction in establishing a race relations
program.
B. DISCUSSION OF IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
An analysis of the MBO project reveals five areas which we feel
adversely affected both the progress and the level of the results
obtained.
1. Time. Although the overall length of time which we scheduled
34
for the implementation project may originally have been sufficient,
O A





the fact that we were only available to assist as advisors one day per
week severely limited our progress. The inability or reluctance of
the individual managers to devote some time during the week to MBO
caused the implementation to become a once.a-week ritual, which
lacked the smooth continuity necessary during the implementation
process.
2. Command Support. The Commanding Officer agreed with the
principle of MBO providing a new and systematic approach to com-
munications management and assured us of his support for the project,
however higher-priority commitments prevented him from attending
any of the Communications Department's meetings. We felt his
presence at the introductory meeting and an occasional word of en-
couragement to his participating managers would have helped the
project significantly. In almost every incidence where MBO has
failed in previous applications, there was also a lack of top manage-
ment support [Granger, 1970; Humble, 1970; Mali, 1972; McConkey,
1972; and Odiorne, 1965].
3. MBO In-House Advisors. As discussed earlier, it is highly
recommended to use well indoctrinated in-house MBO advisors chosen
from within the organization. At the beginning of the project at the
communications station, consideration was given to training an advisor,
However, due to the manning situation and tempo of daily operations,
qualified persons could not be spared by the communications depart-
ment to devote full time to learning and implementing MBO. The
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advantage of having an insider, familiar with the work environment
and the personnel employed, cannot be overlooked. We definitely
felt there was a dissonant reaction to our presence, which could have
been overcome to a great degree if there had been more command
support as mentioned above. The time element was again a factor
here also because we felt it took too long to build up confidence with
the lower managers. Undoubtedly, an in-house advisor would be
much better at analyzing interpersonal situations and also be more
sensitive to the tempo of group operations [March and Simon, 1958].
4. Level of Management Participating. Both Schaffer [1964]
and French [1969] describe lower level management and firstline
supervisors as being constrained in their work activities at their
limited or narrow job structures. We observed this also where the
Chief Petty Officers attempted to enter into the discussions during
the group key results analysis meetings. This is similar to Schaffer'
s
observation of lower level managers:
. . . they are aware of limitations of divided responsi-
bilities but the pattern is so deeply engrained that few
know how to step out of their role and deal with colleagues
or with the chief executive in broad terms that go beyond
or
their job. -> -
Although MBO offers a change in rules to permit them to make con-
tributions to the group's objectives [Schaffer, 1964] this is not easily
35Schaffer, R. H.
,
"Managing by Total Objectives , " AMA
Management Bulletin, 1964, p. 9.
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done and requires time. It is obvious that these firstline supervisors
and managers can offer years of technical and operational experience
to task analysis, but it is difficult for them to think across functional
lines of responsibilities. It may be best to bring in such managers
at a later point in the development of group objectives during the job
improvement phase after broad objectives have been set by the depart-
ment and division managers.
5. Resistance to Change. We observed a general feeling of
resistance towards the project which can be attributed to a variety of
factors, some of which have already been discussed - an outside
image of the MBO advisors; structured thinking on the part of lower
level managers; interruption of old style of managing. These factors
of resistance to MBO were also observed by Humble [1970]. Addition-
ally, time can be a factor of resistance in promoting participative
management if not allowed to proceed slowly enough to allow the
members an opportunity to view the new system [Likert, 1 96 1 ] - It
is obvious that time is an essential feature to all aspects of implement-
ing an MBO program.
C. OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE STUDY
One of our initial objectives in this study was to determine if
problems encountered in implementing MBO in a communications
station environment would differ from those experienced in other
applications. The literature review indicates the five problems

discussed above occur in almost every text written specifically on
implementing an MBO program [Humble, 1970; Mali, 1972; Odiorne,
1965, and Reddin, 1971]. It seems to us that the organizational
function and operational environment, the structure of organization
and the type of personnel associated with the typical Naval com-
munications station would not offer any more involvement or complex-
ity to MBO implementation than found in any other successful applica-
tion of MBO discussed by these authors. There does exist, however,
the recognized special authority that embraces the military organiza-
tion which differentiates it from its civilian counterpart. The point
here is that any change from current management practice to one
that is more participative does not necessarily weaken the authority
of the superior. As we have illustrated previously, authority relation-
ships and acknowledgment of responsibilities are actually strengthened
during the MBO process [Likert, 1961; Schaffer, 1964]. From our
observations, the most difficult level to convince of this are those
firstline supervisors and middle managers with long periods of
military service in specialized areas, i. e. , Senior and Master Chief
Petty Officers, and Warrant Officers. We feel that bringing these
individuals into the MBO program will offer the greatest challenge
to the implementation process, but it is necessary to counter narrow-
gauge attitudes that concentrate each manager's attention solely on
his own group's fraction of contribution to the organization's success.
82

We agree with Schaffer [1964] that this may best be achieved by
firmly establishing MBO at the top of the organization before working
into the lower levels.
Referring again to our objectives set early in this study, we
attempted to examine how the application of MBO would solve some
of the specific problems facing Naval Communi cations. Although the
project was not fully implemented, the partial results achieved
support the argument that MBO is possible within the communications
environment. The problems of organizational planning, coordination
between and within activities and development of managers have been
approached and solved on various levels previously by companies
using MBO. It is on this basis that we suggest that MBO can focus
directly on the problems outlined by the Chief of Naval Operations'
Industrial Advisory Committee on Telecommunications (CIACT) and
Rear Admiral Gravely.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Organizations in both private and government sectors [Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Company, 1966, and the CIACT Report,
1972] recognize the need for more effective and efficient operation
and management of personnel resources. With this recognition also
comes the reality that it is the total organization that is involved and
it calls for a total process [Bennis, 1970]. We feel that MBO and
Assessment Centers have the necessary elements to form such a
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total approach. In the course of our research of MBO, the Assess-
ment Center technique (Appendix A) was studied as a supplement to
MBO procedures in appraising and completely identifying personnel
potential, but was not part of our project at the communications
station. We suggest that further study be undertaken to examine the
feasibility of combining the potential appraisal of the Assessment
Center technique with the performance appraisal of MBO.
Our second but most important recommendation is that a full
and complete application of MBO be implemented at a naval com-
munications activity. It is essential that three or four review cycles
be completed to adequately judge the merits of MBO. The use of
full-time trained in-house MBO advisors during the implementation
and later review stages should avoid the problems encountered in
our project. However, the success of an MBO program calls for
full support and encouragement from the command level and should
be monitored from the headquarters level. Not only should the appli a.
tion of MBO be examined at an activity level, but it should also be
appraised from a systems -wide applicability. Many of the problems
facing naval communications extend throughout the system. We feel
that MBO is a viable and workable integrative management procedure





The term "assessment center" was first related to Murray during
his early work in personality research in the 1930's. In 1943 he was
attached to the Strategic Service Office's (OSS) Assessment Center
which is generally acknowledged to be the first attempt in the United
States to establish such an undertaking in conformity with the so-
called organismic (Gestalt) principles [U.S. OSS Assessment Staff,
1948]. In 1956, tinder the work of Bray, the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company developed a research model of an industrial
36
assessment center for use in its Management Progress Program.
The first non-industrial assessment center was developed at Michigan
Bell in 1958 and labelled the Personnel Assessment Program (PAP).
This was basically an adaptation from the Management Progress
Study which could be operated by specially trained line managers.
From a review of the literature it must be recognized that AT&T,
under Bray, has been the leader in industrial application of the
-3 /
The Management Progress Study is a longitudinal study,
begun in 1956, of the development of young men in a business
management environment. Its purpose was very general _ to learn
more about the characteristics and growth of men as they become,
or try to become, middle and upper managers. The assessment
center per se was only one of several research methods being
used for assessment of management potential.
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assessment center technique. Other companies have quickly followed
suit since about the mid-sixties. Firms such as IBM, General Elec-
tric, J. C. Penney Company, Standard Oil and Sears and Roebuck
have established assessment centers and it has been recently estima-
ted that more than one hundred large and small firms are currently
using this technique and that it is receiving more and more attention
[Slevin, 1972].
The key to the assessment center concept is the broad band
approach of combining predictors in an attempt to get an over-all
assessment of human behavior and personality. The OSS Assessment
Staff summed up their approach by calling it
. . . the multiform organismic system of assessment:
"multiform" because it consists of a rather large number
of procedures based on different principles, and "organismic"
(or "Gestalt" or "holistic") because it utilized the data ob-
tained through these procedures for attempting to arrive at
a picture of personality as a whole; i. e.
,
at the organization
of essential dynamic features of the individual. The knowl-
edge of this organization serves as a basis both for under-
standing and predicting the subject's specific behavior. '
From this observable-wholeness concept, the OSS Staff devised
a series of steps, based on one or more psychological principles,
which woxild produce exercises that would allow such observations.
These steps follow the logic that to predict future performance on
some job, it is necessary to obtain identified observable human
37U.S. OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men: Selection of





behaviors required by that future job and devise exercises which would
require those same observable behaviors.
Key managers familiar with the positions for which the
candidates are to be assessed should discuss this among
themselves, and the center developer should ask them
questions like these: "Can you describe the behavior of
successful and unsuccessful people in the positions in
question? " "How do you evaluate people for this position? "
"What are the tasks to be performed? " "What characteristics
will be needed in our managers 10 years from now? " After
a list has been compiled and agreed upon, another meeting
should be held to determine which of these characteristics
can be assessed adequately on a man's current job. After
eliminating these from the list, the characteristics that
remain become the objectives of the assessment center
program, and the assessment center exercises should be
selected to bring out these behaviors. ^°
Albrook's experience in companies practicing assessment centers
supports this approach. He says the search for what kind of behavior
the company wants to look for is entirely pragmatic [Albrook, 19&8].
After the completion of the exercises and tests assessors apply
ratings and rankings to individual candidates and make comments on
predicted ability based on their judgments. They then must agree
on an over-all judgment on each man, rating him in svich categories
as "more acceptable", "acceptable", "less than acceptable" or
"unacceptable" for promotion. These results are then passed back
to the candidate's supervisors at the company. The results are then
integrated with appraisal information (based on the candidate's job




"Assessment Center for Spotting Future
Managers", Harvard Business Review, July-Aug\ist, 1970, p. 157.
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An important aspect of the assessor's results- report is that it
only represents information to the decision maker and is not designed
to produce thumbs-up or -down determinations by itself. In theory
the center functions in a purely advisory role, but its verdict is
usually persuasive. If a candidate's superior feels strongly that the
assessment is wrong he may be promoted anyway [Albrook, 1968].
A point the OSS Staff was well aware of is that results from all
observations (assessor's) rrmst be combined judgmentally and not
statistically in order to allow proper judgments by persons outside
the assessment center to make actual choices in selection:
To turn in a personality sketch composed entirely of
accounts of the subject's behavior in a variety of sit-
uations is scientifically useless, if not harmful, unless
it goes to an officer who is more talented and experienced
than the. assessor who made the observations. A fact is
fact, and as such provides no grounds for predictive judg-
ment. In order to predict one must at least infer, implic-
itly or explicitly, that a persisting disposition or attribute
of the personality lies behind the fact. It is the professional
function of the psychologist to make inferences of this sort
as well as to report the observations which justify them.
In writing sketches for laymen, facts which do not justify
inferences should be omitted, because the layman will
certainly make his own inferences, automatically if not
deliberately, and if these are unjustified, the decisions
that flow from them may be unfortunate. '
There are a variety of ways to structure an assessment center,
each application designed to fit the needs of the organization. Byham
points out that "there is no right or wrong way to strxicture a center".




Commonly, the actual program operation takes up to three days,
although there exists one-day programs. Additionally, candidates
are almost always grouped to allow for assessment of group inter-
action, and numbers run from 6 to 18, with 12 being the most often
used grovip size. The number of assessors varies from a ratio of
one-to-one with the candidates to a one assessor-to-four candidates.
The qualifications and backgrounds of the assessors vary throughout
industrial applications. Most often they are a mixture of professional
psychologists and semi-indoctrinated company personnel with job
experiences one level above that of the person being assessed. AT&T
uses about 2 professionals per every 4 to 8 company people as asses-
sors, but this varies considerably with some centers using no profes-
sionals for observation but only for training the company assessors.
Company people are rotated (often as a team) through the centers
on a collateral duty basis [Byham, 1970 and Campbell and Bray, 196',
Byham presents a three-day schedule of events which is based






Assigned role group discussion
Study employment interview procedures and applicant
resumes for following day exercises






Group discussion disciplinary cases
Prepare written financial recommendations
Wednesday
Present individual financial analysis
Group reconciles and consolidates a single analysis
In-basket interview
40Candidates rate each other.
Byham has also devised a two-day program which is presented
in the Training and Development Journal:
Day 1 :
Orientation meeting
Management game with four-man teams
Background interview for one and one-half hours
Group discussion on management problem
Individual fact-finding and decision-making exercise
Day 2 ;
In-basket problem followed by interview concerning
the problem completion
Assigned role on a leaderless discussion problem
41
Analysis, presentation and group discussion problem
Jaffee outlines a one-day program which he feels can be accomom-





"The Assessment Center as an Aid in Manage-
ment Development", Training and Development Journal, December,
1971, p. 10-22. Source taken from MBA Thesis by W. B. Cowan, Jr.,
An Evaluation of the Usefulness of the Assessment Center in Personnel











3:00-4:15 Leaderless group discussion
Personnel promotion is the main use of assessment center
results because of the emphasis on predictability and potential
which the apj^roach is designed to evaluate. Most validity studies
of the technique have concentrated in this area. From AT&T's
original sample in 1956, 355 assessees were in the study group.
The objective of the assessment at that time was to predict the like,
lihood of the assessees progressing to middle management within
ten years [Bray and Grant, 1966]. The time was cut to less than
eight years with the results being tabulated in ]965 as follows:






College 125 6 64 30
Non-college 144 45 42 13




Effective Management Selection, Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co., 1971, pp. 15. Source same as footnote 41.
43
These charts are a combined and more general version of the
charts presented by Bray and Grant [1966],
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As indicated, the college graduates progressed more rapidly, but
not unexpectedly so, as they were originally recruited as having
middle management potential, i. e.
,
level 3-4, [ Cabot, 1965 and Bray
and Grant, 1966]. A further refinement of the same data shows
specific levels of management (level 1 is lower or first line manage.
ment, etc. ) achieved by the assessees:
Assessment Predictions Versus Progress 43
Education As sessment Management L 2vel
Background Prediction Achieved (Percent)
and Number 1 2 3-4
Yes 62 2 50 48
College
No or 63 11 78 11
questionable
Yes 41 7 61 32
Non-college
No or 103 60 35 5
questionable
Yes 103 4 54 42
Combined
No or 166 42 5 1 7
questionable
These figures support the predictions made by the assessment
centers. For example, of the 62 college graduates predicted to
achieve higher levels of management, 48 percent reached middle
management. Of those picked not to achieve middle management,
only 11 percent did so. Additional studies have been conducted by
43
These charts are a combined and more general version of the




AT&T and others with similar results [Campbell and Bray, 1967,




A LIST OF REPRESENTATIVE FIRMS USING
MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES
(and Source Used)
Bridgeport Brass Company (Mali)
Colt Heating & Ventilation Limited (Humble)
DuPont (Reddin)
General Electric Corporation (Reddin)
General Foods Corporation (Reddin)
General Mills Corporation (Mali)
General Motors Corporation (Reddin)
Grand Union Company (Mali)
Honeywell Corporation (Mali)
John Player & Sons (Humble)
Minneapolis -Moline Company (Mali)
Monsanto Company (Mali)
North Eastern Region of British Railways (Humble)
Otis Elevator Company (Mali)
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company
Radio Corporation of America (Reddin)
Royal Navy Supply and Transport Service (Humble)
Shell International (Humble)
Socony Oil Company (Reddin)
St. Regis Paper Company (Mali)
Standard Oil Company (Reddin)
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State Farm Insurance Companies (Mali)
3 M Company (Mali)
United Air Lines (Mali)
U. S. Air Force Logistics Command (Reddin)





The Management Guide consists of two separate forms, the first
of which identifies the manager, his position, and the overall scope
and purpose of his job. The overall scope and purpose of a job is a
concise statement which describes the job in general, and how it
relates to the organization's overall goals. A communications officer
of the Naval Communications Station might have filled in the job





OVERALL SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF JOB:
To effectively organize and control
assigned personnel and equipment
to provide for receipt, processing
and transmission of messages within
specific joint and Navy standards.
44The term and concept of the Management Guide is credited to
Humble, Management by Objectives in Action.
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The second form of the Management Guide is the key result area
form. The results of key results analysis with the superior or MBO
advisor are written as a list of key result areas which then form the
major parts or responsibilities of the manager's job. This provides
the framework for determining key tasks in each of the manager's
key result areas to support the overall objectives in steps 1 and 2 of
the MBO process discussed in part II. Refer to Figure 5, column (1)
for an example of a key res\ilt area and listed associated key tasks.
The key task forms only the first part of the manager's objectives as
a statement of action and requires a measurable performance standard
(column 2) to become a reachable objective. The four factors of
quality, quantity, cost and time are useful in deciding satisfactory
achievement (targets or goals) of the objective. As listed in Figure 5,
an additional column is provided to record job improvement items as
they might apply to each key task. Suggestions for improvements
might be noted on the form between reviews of the manager's job as








nA dynamic system which seeks to integrate
the organization's need to clarify and achieve
its performance and growth goals with the




The implementation process of Management By Objectives
(MBO) within the Communications Department will proceed in
basically three phases:
(1) Identification of the Key Result Areas/
Key Tasks of the individual managers;
(2) Identification of possible areas of
improvement; and
(3) Progress Reviews.
The three phases will be implemented through the use of three
separate forms, which are the (1) Management Guide, (2) Job
Improvement Plan, and (3) Performance Appraisal, respectively.
This handout describes the initial preparation of the Management
Guide.
MANAGEMENT GUIDE
The Management Guide consists of two separate forms, the
first of which identifies the. manager, his position, and the overall
scope and purpose of his job. (These forms are located in the
"Forms" section of your notebook. )
The "overall scope and purpose of your job" is a concise state,
ment which describes the job in general, and how it relates to the
organization's overall goals.
Example: To organize and control the Operations
Department in order to meet the planned
operations, service, and contingency
requirements of the Fleet.
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The second form of the Management Guide is provided to assist
you in establishing your Key Result Areas /Key Tasks, and your
performance goals.
Key Result Areas (KRA) _ the few important parts of a manager's
job which, when performed well, result in the manager per-
forming his whole job effectively.
Expressed in another way, the Key Result Areas are those 20%
of the tasks which take up 80% of a manager's time.
Each KRA of your job function should meet the following three
tests:
(1) Relevance _ it must influence the success or failure
of your job;
(2) Independence - it must be reasonably independent to
avoid overlapping KRA;
(3) Measurable - it must have established standards of
performance in terms of job effectiveness.
In describing your KRA, keep in mind the following:
(1) Use as few words as necessary to describe an
area of effectiveness; e.g., "Achievement of
Production Goal", "Personnel Training", etc.
(2) Avoid qualitative/quantitative words such as
"large", "acceptable", etc.
(3) Avoid the use of dates, timings, etc.
(4) Focus on "Outputs" NOT "Inputs"!! For example,
NOT "Maintain Equipment" but "Equipment Avail-
ability"; NOT "Train Equipment Operators" but
"Operator Effectiveness".
(5) While the number of KRA depend upon each manager,
a range of 3 to 7 is normal.
100

Key Task - a precise, unambiguous description of a job function
which defines an action which leads to a performance standard











Ensure that costs of
department are within
budget.
To maintain an effective
repair policy.
Standards of Performance - a description of the results which will be
achieved when each of the Key Tasks is being done well under
the present conditions.
Since each KRA must be measurable, standards of performance
have to be established in order to measure key task effectiveness.
A performance standard states a result or a condition; e. g.
,
"10,000 units per month", "Growth rate of 10%", etc. Also a
standard set should generally not be less than the current level of
activity.
To assist in establishing performance goals, one might ask
elf: "
done well? "
himself What level of results will occur if the task is being
101

Control Data _ the control information by which you yourself can
actually monitor the results for which you are responsible.
Specific control data may already be available or you may have
to establish new methods of control.
Examples: (1) Monthly operations reports
(2) Budget statistics
(3) Customer complaints
(4) (Work) Tally sheets
Suggestions for Improving Present Results - are those actions
which could be taken to achieve higher performance
goals.
All KRA will not necessarily have suggestions for improvement.
Although this part of the Management Guide will not specifically be
addressed in this first phase, the following examples are listed here
to provide a link between the present level of operation and the Job
Improvement Plan to come in Phase 2.
Examples: (1) Present level of production is based upon
outdated marketing data; suggest a new
study be conducted to re -evaluate the
level of production.
(2) Monthly operations report is too bulky and
time- consuming to prepare. Suggest a
more concise report be initiated.
102

As you know, these forms are to be completed by yoxi with the
assistance of an MBO Advisor, and then approved by your immediate
supervisor. Your Management Guide (and later on yo\ir Job Improve-
ment Plan) will be the basis of all your future activities.
You are encouraged to think ahead to Phase 2 about possible areas
of improvement to be incorporated into your Job Improvement Plan.
Keep in mind that although your Management Guide may have been
completed and approved, the flexibility of MBO provides for greater
























































PROPOSED SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
DATE EVENT
3 Nov General meeting with MBO films and
question-answer period. Discuss
Comm Dept's Key Results Areas with
Comm Officer. Schedule general
meeting for 10 Nov.
10 Nov Discuss Key Results Areas with CO.
Conduct general meeting to distribute
MBO notebooks and discuss procedural
handouts. Managers commence defining
their own Key Results Areas. Schedule
individual meetings for 17 Nov.
17 Nov &
1 Dec MBO Advisors condtict individual meetings
with Managers to formulate Key Results
Areas (KRA) and discuss KRA with immed-
iate supervisor.
24 Nov HOLIDAY
8 Dec Carry-over from 1 Dec meetings. Schedule
Management Guide/Job Improvement Plan
meetings for period 13-15 Dec.
13 Dec Management Guide /Job Improvement Plan
thru • meetings as scheduled.
15 Dec
22 Dec & HOLIDAY - MERRY CHRISTMAS k
29 Dec HAPPY NEW YEAR
5 Jan & (OPEN)
12 Jan
19 Jan Progress /Performance Reviews
thru
23 Feb
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Computer Simulation Model Assumptions
The assumptions made regarding this simulation are based upon
our knowledge of the MBO process correlated to a naval communica-
tions station environment. Althoiigh MBO has never been implemented
in a military organization, the input distributions assumed for this
simulation are based upon our military experience and limited data
derived from MBO literature [Humble, 1970],
I. Input Approximation Definitions
A. Normal - the scheduling and conducting of MBO meetings
were based on the Standard Normal (0, 1), and were modified
accordingly to represent expected means and standard
deviations. For the purpose of this simulation, one standard
deviation was assumed to be one-sixth the mean of the nor-
mal, such that six standard deviations would effectively
cover the entire range from zero time to the mean, and
from the mean to the maximum time (See Figure 3).
B. Exponential - the introduction of higher-priority situations
to interrupt the MBO process was based upon the standard
exponential distribution (0-1), and modified accordingly
to represent logical inter-arrival times.
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C. Uniform -used sparingly throughout the simulation to






SKEDG 24 Hrs. 4 Hrs.
SKEDI 8 Hrs. 1. 3 Hrs.
GMEET 2 Hrs. . 3 Hrs.
IMEET 2 Hrs.
. 3 Hrs.
RMEET 1.5 Hrs. .25 Hrs.
MGTGD 40 Hrs. 6. 6 Hrs.
2. Exponential Distributions
Average inter-arrival time: 2 interruptions
per 8-hour workday.
Average length of interruption: 30 minutes
3. Uniform Distributions:















a. Average inter-arrival time: 2 interruptions
per 8-hour workday
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TRANSFER BLOCK TO SIMUI \11,
VARYING PROBABII [TIE! I







* COMPUTER PRINTED INPUT LISTINGS ' : "
THE FOLLOWING COMPUTER INPUTS ARE THE COMPLETE LISTINGS
RFOUIRED Tn SIMULATE THE TWO IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES
DESCRIBED IN CHAPTER III, PART E. THE SIMULATION WAS
RUN ON AN IBM SYSTEM 360/67. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION,










THE CONTROL CARDS INSERTED AT THE END OF THE RESPECTIVE
PROGRAMS AUTOMATICALLY VARY THE 'PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS'
FACTORS DURING EACH SUCCESSIVE RUN. (SEE THE DETAILED
SUBROUTINES OF THE SYSTEM FLOWCHARTS LOCATED IN APPENDIX
E FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION.)
v f | \. ' At : k* ', " i •- -.: v - i r r w '
* INDIVIDUAL APPROACH '
• i"
c p y £ $ •>. :: =>-;--•;<» v :• >: :;• .'«.:' •« rt^-.^irt :':'; *.
SIMULATE
SYMBOLIC DEFINITIONS
SKEDG TIME REQUIRED TO SCHEDULE A GENERAL MEETING
SKFDI TIKE REQUIRED TO SCHEDULE AN INDIVIDUAL MEETING
GMEET TIME REQUIRED TO CONDUCT A GENERAL MEETING
IMEET TIME REQUIRED TO CONDUCT AN INDIVIDUAL MEETING
RMEET TIME REQUIRED TO CONDUCT A REVIEW MEETING
MGTGD TIME REQUIRED TO PREPARE MANAGEMENT GUIDE
RTIME RESIDENCE TIME OF MBO TRANSACTION IN SYSTEM
INTRP MBO CONFERENCES IN SESSION WHICH ARE INTERRUPTED
BY HIGHER PRIORITY SITUATIONS
DELAY SCHEDULED MBO MEETINGS WHICH ARE DELAYED IN
STARTING DUE TO HIGHER PRIORITY SITUATIONS
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THF FCL LOWING VARIABLE FUNCTIONS ARE USFD TO


















M = 2 HRS/SD=.3 HRS
M=1.5 HRS/SD=.25 HRS
M = 40 HRS/SD= 6.6 HRS
DEFINITION OF CONTINUOUS FUNCTION, NORMAL (0,1), USED
TO APPROXIMATE TIME ADVANCES IN MODEL SEGMENT I.
SNORM FUNCTION RN1.C2 5
0,-5/. 00003, -4/. 00 135* -3/. 00 62 1,-2. 5/. 022 75, -2
.06 68 1.-1.5/. 11507, -1.2/. 15866,-1/. 211 86, -.8/. 27 42 5,
.3445 8, -.4/. 42 07 4,-. 2/. 5,0/. 57926,. 2/. 65542, .4
.72575. .6/. 788 14, .8/ .84134, 1/. 8849 3, 1.2/. 93 31 9, 1.5
.97 72 5, 2/. 993 7 9, 2. 5/. 9 986 5, 3/. 99 99 7, 4/ 1,5
-.6
DEFINITION OF CONTINUOUS





0,0/. 1 , .104/ .2,. 222/. 3,. 355/. 4, .509/. 5, .69/. 6,. 915/. 7, 1.2
.75, 1.3 3/. 8, 1.6/. 84, 1.6 3/. 08, 2. 12/. 9, 2. 3/. 92, 2. 5 2/. 94, 2. 81











DEL AY, 10, 10,7
MGTGD, 1440,240, 10
1;
RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CONTROL CARD
4G RMULT 17,481
MODEL SEGMENT I
EACH TRANSACTION REPRESENTS ONE IMPLEMENTATION OF M30
116

IN A NAVCCf-MSTA USING
INDIVIDUAL APPFOACH
TWO ADVISORS AND THE













































I DC I SPLIT 1,L0C1A
ASSIGN 1,K3










CHG2 TRANSFER .1 , ,L0P1
CHG2A LOOP 1, LDP1
TRANSFER ,SKI PI








CHG3 TRANSFER . 1 , , L0P1A
CHG3A LOOP 1, LCP1A
SCHEDULE FIRST TWC INTRO-
DUCTORY MEETINGS FOR ALL
LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT
FIRST INTRODUCTORY MEETING
TWO DAYS BETWEEN MEETINGS
SECOND INTRODUCTORY MEETING
SCHEDULE LVL1 KRA MEETING
LVL1 KRA MEETING
SCHEDULE INDIVIDUAL MEETING
TO VERIFY MANAGEMENT GUIDE
LVL21 MANAGERS PREPARE
MANAGEMENT GUIDE
LVL21 MANAGERS REVIEW MAN-
AGEMENT GUIDE WITH ADVISOR
LVL22 MANAGERS REVIEW MAN-















































CHG4 TRANSFER .1, , L0P3A
CHG4A LOOP 1, L0P3A
TRANSFER , S K I P 3
L0C3 ASSIGN 1,K6




ADVANCE VI I MEET
RELEASE ADVR2
RELEASF LVL32
CHG5 TRANSFER .1 , , L0P3B
























LVL31 MANAGERS REVIEW MAN-
AGEMENT GUIDE WITH ADVISOR
LVL32 MANAGERS REVIEW MAN-












































MODEL SEGMENTS II, III, AND IV
it









































240, FNSXPDIS, , , 1
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TIME REQUIRED TO SCHEDULE A GENERAL MEETING
TIME REQUIRED TO SCHEDULE A REVIEW MEETING
TIME REQUIRED TO CONDUCT A GENERAL MEETING








MEET2 TIME REQUIRED TO CONDUCT A THIRD GENERAL MEETING
RMEET TIME REQUIRED TO CONDUCT A REVIEW MEETING
RTIME RESIDENCE TIME OF MBO TRANSACTION IN SYSTEM
INTRP MRO CONFERENCES IN SESSION WHICH ARE INTERRUPTED
BY HIGHER PRIORITY SITUATIONS
DELAY SCHEDULED MBO MEETINGS WHICH ARE DELAYED IN
STARTING DUE TO HIGHER PRIORITY SITUATIONS
THE FOLLOWIN3 VARIABLE FUNCTIONS ARE USED TO
APPROXIMATE TIME ADVANCES BASED UPON THE CONTINUOUS



















DEFINITION OF CONTINUOUS FUNCTION, NORMAL (0,1), USED
TO APPROXIMATE TIME ADVANCES IN MODEL SEGMENT I.
SNORM FUNCTION RN1,C25
0,-5/. 00003, -4/. 00 13 5, -3/. 00 62 1,-2. 5/. 02275, -2
.06 681 .-1.5/. 11 507,-1 .2/. 15 866,-1/. 21 186, -.8/. 27 42 5, -.6
.3 445 8, -.4/. 4? 07 4,-. 2/. 5,0/. 57926, .2/. 6 5542,.
4
. 72 57 5,. 6/. 78814,. 8/. 841 34, 1/. 8849 3, 1.2/. 93319, 1.5
.9 7725,2/. 99 3 79, 2. 5/. 9986 5, 3/. 99997, 4/ 1,5
DEFINITION OF CONTINUOUS FUNCTION, EXPONENTIAL DISTPI
BUTION (0 TO 1), USED TO GENERATE TRANSACTIONS IN
MODEL SEGMENT II.
XPDIS FUNCTION RN2,C24
0,0 /.l , . 104/. 2.. 22 2/. 3,. 355/. 4, .50 9/. 5,. 69/. 6,. 915/. 7, 1.2
.75, 1.38/. 8, 1.6/. 84. 1.83/. 88, 2. 12/. 9, 2. 3/. 92, 2. 52/. 94, 2. 81





















EACH TRANSACTION REPRESENTS ONE IMPLEMENTATION OF






















































































































SCHEDULE LVL1 KRA MEETING
LVL1 KRA MEETING
SCHEDULE INTRODUCTORY MEET-
ING FOR LVL2 AND LVL3
LVL2 AND LVL3 INTRODUCTCF
MEETING
SCHEDULE LVL2 KRA MEETING
LVL2 KRA MEETING












































































TRANSFER .] , LCC2.AGIND
AGIND QUEUE WA IT
ADVANCE VSSKEDG
DEPART WAIT
LVL2 KRA REVIEW MEETING
SCHEDULE LVL3 KRA MEETING
LVL3 KRA MEETING
SCHEDULE LVL3 KRA REVIEW
MEETING WITH LVL2
LVL3 KRA REVIEW MEETING
SCHEDULE SECOND LVL1 KRA
MEETING AFTER FIRST KRA
INVALID
SECOND LVL1 KRA MEETING
WITH LEARNING-CURVE EFFECT
SCHEDULE THIRD LVL1 KRA
MEETING AFTER SECOND KRA
INVALID
THIRD LVL1 KRA MEETING
WITH ADDITIONAL LEARNING-
CURVE EFFECT
SCHEDULE SECOND LVL2 KRA
MEETING AFTER FIRST KRA
INVALID
SECOND LVL2 KRA MEETING
WITH LEARNING-CURVE EFFECT
SCHEDULE THIRD LVL2 KRA
















































































































THIRD LVL2 KRA MEETING
WITH ADDITIONAL LEARNING-
CURVE EFFECT
SCHEDULE LVL2 KRA MEETING
AFTER LVL2 KRA REVIEW
SECOND LVL2 KRA REVIEW
MEETING
SCHEDULE SECOND LVL3 KRA
MEETING AFTER FIRST KRA
INVALID
SECOND LVL3 KRA MEETING
WITH LEARNING-CURVE EFFECT
SCHFDULE THIRD LVL3 KRA
MEETING AFTER SECOND KRA
INVALID
THIRD LVL3 KRA MEETING
WITH ADDITIONAL LEARNING-
CURVE EFFECT
SCHEDULE LVL3 KRA MEETINC
AFTER LVL3 KRA REVIEW






FACH TRANSACTION REPRESENTS HIGHER-











24 0.FN1XPDIS, , ,1







». MODFL SEGMENT J II TIMER SEGMENT
A
*
GFMFRATE 900000 COMMENCE IMPLEMENTATION
TERMINATE 1 CLOCK
>: CONTROL CARDS
START 1 START FIRST RUN
CHG1 TRANSFER . 4 , LOC A , AG I NA
CHG? TRANSFER .4 , L0C2 * AG I NC
CHG3 TRANSFER .4 , L0C4 , AG I NF
RNG RMULT 39,93
CLEAR
START 1 START SECOND RUN
CHG1 TRANSFER . 5 , LOC A , AG IN
A
CHG? TRANSFER .5 , L0C2 « AG INC
CHG3 TRANSFER . 5 , LCC4 , AG I NF
RNG RMULT 47 3,347
CLEAR
START 1 START THIRD RUN
CHG1 TRANSFER . 6 , LOC A , AG I N
CHG? TRANSFER .6 , L0C2 , AG I NC
CHG3 TRANSFER . 6 , L0C4 , AG I NF
RNG RMULT 1, 1
CLEAR
START 1 START FOURTH RUN
CHG1 TRANSFER . 7 , LOC A , AG I N
CHG? TRANSFER .7 , L0C2 , AG I NC
CHG3 TRANSFER . 7 , LCC4 , AG I NF
RNG RMULT 7,21
CLEAR
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